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Online Modelling The Novice-Expert Shift in Programming Skills on a Rule-Schema-Case Partial Order*

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Abstract

This paper describes an approach to model students' *knowledge growth* from novice to expert within the framework of a help system, ABSYNT, in the domain of functional programming. The help system has expert knowledge about a large solution space. This is necessary because especially novices often produce "unusual" solutions. On the other hand, it requires a model of the students' actual state of domain knowledge in order to provide user-centered help. The model distinguishes between knowledge acquisition and knowledge improvement. *Knowledge acquisition* is represented by augmenting the model with expert planning knowledge represented as rules. The acquisition of malrules is possible, too. *Knowledge improvement* is represented by rule composition. In this way, the knowledge contained in the model can be located on a gradual *continuum* from general *rules* to more specific *schemas* for solution fragments to specific *cases* (= example solutions).

1. Introduction

Modelling knowledge acquisition processes has been recognized as a necessary extension to *status models*, i.e., of bugs in skills (Anderson, 1983, 1986, 1989; Brown & Burton, 1982; Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Rosenbloom & Newell, 1986, 1987; Rosenbloom et al., 1991; Sleeman, 1984) to answer questions like: Which order is the best for a set of tasks to be worked on? Why is information useless to one person and helpful to another? How is help and instructional material to be designed? Answering these questions requires hypotheses about the learner's knowledge states and knowledge acquisition processes. This is especially true within help and tutoring systems (Frasson & Gauthier, 1990; Kearsley, 1988; Sleeman & Brown, 1982; Wenger, 1987), where online diagnosis of the learner's knowledge is necessary in order to react in an adequate way. This diagnosis has to be both efficient and valid. But to achieve both goals is a difficult problem (Self, 1990, 1991) because there is only a limited source of information, the learner's *stream of actions*.

We model the change of knowledge with two models: the *internal model* (IM) and the *external model* (EM). The IM (described in this paper) is an integrated part of the help system. Its purpose is to provide user-centered feedback to the stream of problem solving actions. The EM is not a part of the help system ("external" to it) but is designed to simulate the knowledge acquisition process of learners on a level of detail,

including protocol analyses of verbal data, not available to the IM. The IM *describes* the hypothetical knowledge growth of the learner. The EM is more detailed. It contains hypothetical control knowledge and thus provides hypothetical *reasons* for the knowledge changes described in the IM.

If IM and EM are empirically valid, then they should predict the same sequence of knowledge states and action sequences. So we hope to achieve a *model of the change of knowledge states* which is usable as an efficient diagnosis tool (the IM), and a detailed model of knowledge acquisition processes (the EM), where both models are valid and consistent mutually and with the ISP-DL Theory (see next chapter).

2. The ISP-DL Knowledge Acquisition Theory

For modelling the knowledge acquisition process, a theoretical position concerning *problem solving* and *learning* is necessary which is able to describe the shift of the learner from novice to expert. We have integrated several approaches into a theory we call ISP-DL Theory (*Impasse-Success-Problem Solving-Driven-Learning-Theory*).





For the informal description of our theory we use *hierarchical higher Petri-nets* (Huber et al., 1990). The process is divided into 4 recursive subprocesses: "Problem Processing", "Goal Processing", "Nonoperational Goal processing" and "Operational Goal Processing" (Figures 1-4). *Places* represent states or data memories whereas transitions represent events or process steps. Places can contain tokens which represent mental objects (goals, memory traces, heuristics etc.) or real objects (eg. a solution or a behaviour protocol). Places can be marked with tags (B for border place, FG for global fusion set). A FG tagged place is common to several nets (eg. the Knowledge Base). *Transitions* can be tagged with HI (HI for hierarchical invocation transition). This means that the process is continued in a fresh created instance of the subnet. Within the dotted boxes it is shown which places are corresponding places in the calling net and the called net. Shaded transitions and places are of concern for the IM.

Problem Solving is started in the page "*Problem Processing*" (figure 1). The problem solver (PS) strives for one goal to choose out of the set of goals: "*deliberate*".

A goal may be viewed as a set of facts about the environment which the problem solver wants to become true (Newell, 1982). More precisely, a goal can be expressed as a *predicative description* which is to be achieved by a problem solution. For example, the goal to create a program which tests if a natural number is even, "even(n)", can be expressed by the description: "funct even = (nat n) bool : exists ((nat k) :

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$2 * k = n$). This goal is achieved if a program is created which satisfies this description.

The goal is processed in the page "Goal Processing" (Figure 2). If the PS comes up with a solution, the used knowledge is optimized deductively: *deductive knowledge optimization*. When the PS encounters a similar problem, the solution time will be shorter. The net is left, when there are no tokens in "Goals", "Goal" and "Solutions".

In the page "Goal Processing" (Figure 2) the PS checks whether his set of problem solving operators is sufficient for a solution: "operational?"/"non-operational?".


In the latter case, the process is continued in page "non-operational goal processing" (Figure 3). The problem can be decomposed and subsolutions are composed to a final solution.

In the former case processing is done according to the page "operational goal processing" (Figure 4). A plan is synthesized. This may be a partial ordered sequence or hierarchy of problem solving operators or heuristics. The PS is in favour of applying problem solving operators. If he uses heuristics a memory trace is kept. Anyway, a problem solving protocol is generated, which is used in combination with

the knowledge base to evaluate the outcome. The result of the evaluation generates an impasse or a success. The result of the evaluation is transferred back to the page "Goal Processing".

The reaction of the PS to success is: leave "Goal Processing" with a solution. On the other hand the reaction to an impasse is the creation of subgoals to use weak heuristics for problem solving. The corresponding problem solving process creates heuristic-based solutions and memory traces during the application of the heuristics. After that the PS will generate inductively a new operator on the basis of the memory trace and the knowledge about a success.

It is possible and necessary to refine the theory's transitions and places. For our purpose this simple theory is sufficient. Important for the rest of the paper is the theoretically and empirically validated statement: *New knowledge is acquired only at impasse time after the successful application of weak heuristics and on the basis of memory traces. Information is helpful only in impasses and if it is synchronized with the knowledge state of the PS.*



3. The ABSYNT Problem Solving Monitor

The ABSYNT problem solving monitor provides an *iconic programming environment* (Figure 5) and is aimed at supporting novices' acquisition of functional programming concepts up to recursive systems (Möbus, 1990; Möbus & Thole, 1990). The main components of ABSYNT are: a visual editor, trace and a help component. The *help component* consists of two parts: a hypotheses testing environment, and a set of visual planning rules. In the *hypotheses testing environment*, the learner may state hypotheses (bold parts of the program in the upper worksheet in Figure 5) about the correctness of total programs or parts thereof. The hypothesis is: "Is it possible to embed the bold marked fragment of the program in a correct solution?". If the hypothesis can be confirmed the PS is shown a copy of the hypothesis. If this information is not sufficient to resolve the impasse, the PS can ask for more information.

The student's proposal (Figure 5, upper half) for the "even" problem does not terminate for odd arguments. Despite of that his/her hypothesis (bold) is embeddable in a correct solution. When s/he wants to see the two complements of the hypothesis the PS has two possibilities to uncover the complements. The PS now knows that s/he can repair the program by two substitutions: 1) $\text{even} = (a, 0) / T$ and 2) $T = \text{even} / (a, 0)$ (Figure 5, lower half). This means an interchange of program parts.

One reason for the hypotheses testing approach is that in functional programming a bug usually *cannot be absolutely localized*, and there is a variety of ways to debug a wrong solution. Hypotheses testing leaves this decision to the PS and thereby provides a rich data source about the learner's knowledge state.

The answers to the learner's hypotheses are generated by

rules defining a *goals-means-relation (GMR)*. These rules may be viewed as "pure" expert knowledge not influenced by learning. Thus we will call this set of rules EXPERT in the remainder of the paper. Currently, EXPERT contains 622 rules and analyzes and synthesizes several millions of solutions for 40 tasks (Möbus, 1990; 1991; Möbus & Thole, 1990).

For *adaptive* help generation, the EXPERT rules have to be augmented by an *internal* student model (IM). The function of the IM is to select the completion which is *maximally consistent* with the learner's current knowledge state. This should reduce the learner's surprise to a minimum.

4. GMR Rules

This section describes the GMR-rules which can be partitioned in two ways: *ruletype* (simple, composed) vs. *database* of the rules (EXPERT, POSS, IM). We have three kinds of *simple rules*: goal elaboration rules, rules implementing one ABSYNT node, and rules implementing ABSYNT program heads. *Composite rules* are created by merging at least two successive rules parsing a solution. Composites may be produced from simple rules and composites. A composite which contains at least one variable which can be bound to a subtree is called a *schema*. If all variables in a composite can only be bound to node names or values, then the composite is called a *case*.

The other way to split the set GMR is the *data base* of the rules. EXPERT contains the expert domain knowledge. The sets IM and POSS are created at runtime and will be described below.

Now, we will provide examples for *simple rules* which will be depicted in their visual representations (Figure 6). Each rule has a *rule head* (left hand side, pointed to by the arrow) and a *rule body* (right hand side, where the arrow is

pointing from). The rule head contains a *goal -implementation - pair* where the goal is contained in the ellipse and the implementation is contained in the rectangle. The rule body contains one goal - implementation - pair or a conjunction of several pairs, or a primitive predicate.




Figure 6 The first rule of Figure 6 is the goal elaboration rule E1. It can be read:

If (rule head):
 your main goal is "absdiff" with two subgoals S1 and S2,
 then leave space for a program tree yet to be implemented and (rule body):
 If in the next planning step you create the new goal "branching" with the three subgoals "less_than (S1, S2)", "difference (S2, S1)", and "difference (S1, S2)", then the program tree which solves this new goal will also be the solution for the main goal"

O1 in Figure 6 is an example of a simple rule implementing one ABSYNT node (operator, parameter, or constant):

If (rule head):
 your main goal is "branching" with three subgoals (IF, THEN, ELSE),
 then implement an "if-then-else"-node with three connections leaving from this node, and leave space above these connections for three program trees P1, P2, P3 yet to be implemented.
 and (rule body):
 if in the next planning step you pursue the goal IF, then its solution P1 will also be at P1 in the solution of the main goal, and
 if in the next planning step you pursue the goal THEN, then its solution P2 will also be at P2 in the solution of the main goal, and
 if in the next planning step you pursue the goal ELSE, then its solution P3 will also be at P3 in the solution of the main goal.

5. Composition of Rules

In our theory, composites represent improved sped-up knowledge. Together with the simple rules, they constitute a *gradual continuum* from general planning rules to solution schemata to specific cases representing complete solution examples. In this section we will define rule composition.

If we view the rules as Horn clauses (Kowalski, 1979), then the composite RIJ of two rules RI and RJ can be described by the inference rule:

$$RI: (F \leftarrow P \ \& \ C) \qquad RJ: (P' \leftarrow A)$$

$$RIJ: (F \leftarrow A \ \& \ C)\sigma$$

The two clauses above the line resolve to the resolvent below the line. A, C are conjunctions of atomic formulas. P, P', and F are atomic formulas. σ is the most general unifier of P and P'.

For example we can compose the *schema* C7 (Figure 7) out of the set of simple rules {O1, O5, L1, L2}, where:

- O1: $gmr(branching(If,Then,Else), ite-pop(P1, P2, P3)) :- gmr(If, P1), gmr(Then, P2), gmr(Else, P3).$
- O5: $gmr(equal(S1, S2), eq-pop(P1, P2)) :- gmr(S1, P1), gmr(S2, P2).$
- L1: $gmr(parm(P), P-pl) :- is_parm(P).$
- L2: $gmr(const(C), C-cl) :- is_const(C).$
- C7: $gmr(branching(equal(parm(Y), const(C)), parm(X), Else), ite-pop(eq-pop(Y-pl, C-cl), X-pl, P)) :- is_parm(Y), is_const(C), is_parm(X), gmr(Else, P).$

- ite-pop = primitive ABSYNT operator "if-then-else"
- eq-pop = primitive ABSYNT operator "="
- P-pl = unnamed ABSYNT parameter node
- C-cl = empty ABSYNT constant node




Figure 7 We can describe the composition of node implementing rules RI and RJ with a shorthand notation:

$$RIJ = RI_k \cdot RJ$$

The index k denotes the place k in the goal tree of the head of RI. A place k is the k-th variable leaf numbered from left to right (e.g.: $O1_3 = Else$). The semantics of " \cdot " can be described in three steps. First, the variable in place k in the goal term of RI is substituted by the goal term in the head of RJ. Second the call term P in the body of RI which contains the k-th variable and which unifies with the head of RJ is replaced by the body of RJ. Third the unifier σ is applied to this term resulting in the composed rule RIJ.

As an example $O1_2 \cdot L1 = gmr(branching(If, parm(P), Else), ite-pop(P1,P,P3)) :- gmr(If,P1),is_parm(P), gmr(Else, P3)$. C7 can be composed out of the ruleset {O1, O5, L1, L2} in 12 different ways. Two possibilities are:

$$C7 = (O1_2 \cdot L1)_1 \cdot ((O5_2 \cdot L2)_1 \cdot L1)$$

or

$$C7 = (((O1_1 \cdot O5)_3 \cdot L1)_2 \cdot L2)_1 \cdot L1$$

6. Empirical Constraints of Simple Rules, Chains, Schemata and Cases

Rules, rule chains and schemata give rise to different *empirical predictions*. Novices work *sequentially*, set more subgoals, and need more control decisions, while experts work in *parallel*, set less subgoals, and need less control decisions. This difference is reflected in the continuum from simple rules to schemata to specific cases or solution

examples.

We pose the following hypotheses:

- If the problem solver applies a rule which contains a goal tree and a program fragment in its head, then these goals may be *verbalized* and this fragment is implemented in a *continuous uninterrupted* action sequence. Verbalizations and actions are *intermixed*.

- If the problem solver applies a rule which contains subgoals in its body, then these subgoals may be *verbalized*.


Comparing the application of a *composite* to the application of the corresponding *chain of simple rules*, this leads to the following empirical consequences:

- For the composite, the *order* in which the parts of the program fragments in the rule head are implemented is *indeterminate* and *not predictable*. The same is true for the verbalized goals in the goal tree.

- For the rule chain, not only the *set* but also the *order* of programming actions is *predictable*.

- The composite is accompanied by verbalizations to a *less* degree. Cases should *not* be accompanied by verbalizations *at all*. For the rule chain, the content and the order of the verbalizations is *predictable*.

- Compared to the corresponding chain of simple rules, the program fragment in the head of the composite is programmed *faster*, because of the simpler goal structure of the composite and the smaller number of control decisions.



These relationships are illustrated in Figure 8 (suppressing the location information for compositions). The rulesets are organized in a *partial order* which reflects the *degree of verbalization*, *performance time*, and *degree of predictability* of the order of programming actions.

The application of chains of rules, which can be built from the rule sets containing simple rules and composites, and the schema C7 all lead to the *same* solution: the not yet finished ABSYNT program depicted in the head of C7. But we would expect differences in *verbalizations* and *performance time*. For example, the rule chain built out of the elements of the set {O1, O5, L1, L2} should be accompanied by more verbalizations and longer performance time than the other rule chains and C7 (in Figure 8).

For example the *rule chain* (O1, L1, O5, L2, L1) which when composed generates C7 according to $(O1_2 \cdot L1)_1 \cdot ((O5_2 \cdot L2)_1 \cdot L1)$ leads to the prediction of the stream of events: $events(O1) < events(L1) < events(O5) < events(L2) < events(L1)$, where:

- $events(O1) = \{verb(branching(*,*,*)), act(if-then-else), act(link(if-then-else_1, P1)), act(link(if-then-else_2, P2)), act(link(if-then-else_3, P3)), space(P1), space(P2), space(P3)\}$,
- $events(L1) = \{verb(parameter(*)), act(parameter(X))\}$,

- $events(O5) = \{verb(equal(*,*)), act(=), act(link(=1, P1)), act(link(=2, P2)), space(P1), space(P2)\}$
 - $events(L2) = \{verb(constant(*)), act(constant(C))\}$
 - $events(L1) = \{verb(parameter(*)), act(parameter(X))\}$.
- A < B means that the events of set A are followed by the events in set B.

The empirical meaning of the terms is:

- $verb(Functor(*, ..., *))$: the value of Functor and the instantiated arguments of Functor are *possibly* verbalized
- $act(Functor)$: the Functor will necessarily be implemented by an ABSYNT node
- $act(Functor(*))$: the Functor will be *necessarily* be implemented by an ABSYNT node which content is filled by the argument value
- $act(link(Node1_i, Node2))$: *necessarily* an ABSYNT link will be implemented between the i-th input of ABSYNT-Node1 and ABSYNT-Node2.
- $space(*)$: *necessarily* a space in the programming environment will be reserved for the program fragment which is denoted by the argument of space.

The empirical predictions of the *schema C7* are *less constrained*. The prediction is not a sequence of event sets but only one set of events:

- $events(C7) = \{verb(branching(*,*,*)), verb(equal(*,*)), verb(parameter(*)), verb(constant(*)), act(if-then-else), act(=), act(parameter(Y)), act(constant(C)), act(parameter(X)), act(link(if-then-else_1,=)), act(link(if-then-else_2, X)), act(link(if-then-else_3, P)), act(link(=1, Y)), act(link(=2, C)), space(P)\}$.

7. Evolution of the IM during Problem Solving

The IM has the following general features:

- In accordance with ISP-DL-Theory, the IM contains simple rules representing acquired but not yet improved knowledge, and composites representing various degrees of expertise.

- Since knowledge improvement should result in sped-up performance, a composite becomes part of the IM only if the PS shows a speedup from an earlier to a later action sequence where both sequences can be produced by the composite or the corresponding chain of simple rules.

- The IM contains only simple rules and composites which proved to be *plausible* with respect to an action sequence at least once. By this we mean the following:

Except for "goal elaboration rules", the simple rules and composites contain a program fragment in their rule head (Figures 6 and 7). Thus if the PS applies a certain rule from his domain knowledge, then we expect that he implements the program fragment in the head of the rule in an *uninterrupted* temporal sequence. The *order* of action steps *within* this sequence is *indeterminate*.

With respect to some sequence of actions, simple rules and composites form four subsets:

1. Rules not containing any program fragments ("goal elaboration rules") are *nondecisive* with respect to the action sequence. (But fragments of verbalizations can be related to the goal elaboration rules; Möbus & Thole, 1990).

2. Rules whose *head* contains a program fragment which is part of the final result produced by the action sequence, and which was programmed in a *noninterrupted*, temporally continuous subsequence. These rules are *plausible* with respect to the action sequence.

3. Rules also containing a program fragment which is part of the final result of the action sequence, but this fragment corresponds only to the result of a noncontinuous action subsequence *interrupted* by other action steps. These rules are *implausible* with respect to the action sequence.

4. Rules whose head contains a program fragment which is not part of the final result produced by the action sequence. These rules are *irrelevant* to the action sequence.

- A *credit* scheme rewards the usefulness of the rules in the IM. The credit of a rule is the number of action steps explained by this rule in the problem solving process of the PS. Thus the *credit is determined by the length of the action sequence explained by the rule and the number of its successful applications.*

- According to ISP-DL-Theory, a simple rule acquired by impasse-driven learning can only be improved after its successful application (success-driven learning). This implies for the IM that it cannot at the same time be augmented by a new simple rule and by composites built from this simple rule. Rather, the possible composites have to wait for incorporation in the IM. For this reason, in addition to the IM there is a set POSS of possible candidates for future composites of the IM. Composites of the rules used for parsing a solution proposal are generated in a generate-and-test-cycle and kept in POSS as candidates. Those surviving a test phase are then moved into the IM. So the IM contains only simple rules and composites for which we hypothesize that the learner *uses them already*, whereas POSS contains only composites which the PS *might have created* as a result of success-driven learning, but did *not use* them yet.




Figure 9

en learning, but did *not use* them yet.

Figure 9 shows the development of the IM during the knowledge acquisition process. We will explain Figure 9:

Start (Top of Figure 9): Before performing the first programming task, both sets IM and POSS are empty.

$i := 1$: Now the learner solves the first task.

First Test: IM and POSS are empty, so nothing happens.

First Parse: The learner's solution to the first programming task is parsed with the EXPERT rules.

First Generate: The EXPERT rules just used for parsing are compared to the action sequence which produced the learner's solution, and which is saved in a log file. The plausible parse EXPERT rules are put into the IM and get credit. These rules are hypothesized as newly acquired by the

PS solving the first task.

Next, the composites of all parse rules are created and compared to the action sequence. The plausible composites are kept in POSS. They are candidates of improved knowledge useful for future tasks. For each plausible composite, the time needed by the PS to perform the corresponding action sequence is attached.

$i := i + 1$: Now the learner solves the second task.

Second Test: Each composite in POSS is checked if

a) it is plausible with respect to the action sequence, and

b) the time needed by the PS to perform the respective continuous action sequence is shorter than the time attached to the composite.

The composites meeting these requirements are put into the IM. Composites in POSS which are irrelevant to the action sequence of the solution just created are left in POSS. They might prove as useful composites on future tasks. All other composites violate the two requirements. They are skipped. (That is, composites *implausible* to the actual sequence, or composites which predict a *more speedy* action sequence than observed). Finally, the credits of all rules in the IM which are plausible with respect to the present action sequence are updated.

Second Parse: Now the solution of the second task is parsed with the rules of the IM ordered by their credits. As far as needed, EXPERT rules are also used for parsing.

Second Generate: The plausibility of EXPERT rules which have just been used for parsing is checked. The plausible EXPERT parse rules are again put into the IM and get credit. As in the first Generate Phase, they are hypothesized as the newly acquired knowledge in response to impasses on the task just performed. Furthermore, the composites of all actual parse rules are created. The plausible composites are put into POSS, they will be tested on the next test phase. Again the time needed for the corresponding action sequence is stored with each composite.




Figure 10

8. An Empirical Example for Plausability

For illustrations, Figure 10 shows a continuous fragment of the action sequence of a PS, Subject 2 (S2), on a program-

ming task. We will restrict our attention to the rules O1, O5, L1, L2, and C7 (see Figures 6 and 7). When S2 performs the sequence of Figure 10, O1, L1 and L2 are already in the IM from earlier tasks. O5 is not yet in the IM but only in the set of EXPERT rules. C7 has not yet been created.

When S2 has solved the task, the *Test Phase* (Figure 9) starts. Since the only composite we look at here (C7) has not been created, we only consider the fourth subphase: Credit updating. O1 is *implausible* with respect to Figure 10 because the actions corresponding to the rule head of O1 are not continuous but *interrupted*. They are performed at 11:15:52, 11:15:58, 11:16:46, and 11:16:55 (Figure 10). Thus the action sequence corresponding to the rule head of O1 is interrupted at 11:16:42 and 11:16:50.

L1 and L2 are also implausible. Actions corresponding to L1 are performed the first time at 11:15:08 and 11:15:29. Thus this sequence is interrupted at 11:15:16 and 11:15:22. L1-like actions are shown a second time by the PS at 11:16:42 and 11:16:50. These are interrupted, too. Actions corresponding to L2 are performed at 11:15:16 and 11:15:34, with interruptions at 11:15:22 and 11:15:29. So since O1, L1, and L2 are implausible, their credits are not changed.

Now S2's solution is *parsed* with rules in the IM and, as needed, with additional EXPERT rules (Figure 9). O1, O5, L1, and L2 are among the parse rules in this case, as no other rules have a higher credit and are able to parse the solution.

After the Parse Phase, the *Generate Phase* (Figure 9) starts. O5 is an EXPERT rule used for parsing. But O5 is *implausible*, since its corresponding actions were performed at 11:15:22, 11:15:38, and 11:15:43, with interruptions at 11:15:29 and 11:15:34. So O5 is not put into the IM. Then the composites of the parse rules are formed. C7 (Figure 7) is a composite formed from O1, O5, L1 and L2. This composite is *plausible* because it describes the uninterrupted sequence of programming actions from 11:15:08 to 11:16:55 (see Figure 10) - despite the fact that its components O1, O5, L1, and L2 are all implausible. Starting from the beginning of the task (at 11:14:40), the time for this action sequence is 135 seconds. Thus the composite C7 is stored in POSS with "135 seconds" attached to it.

After S2 has solved the next task, the now following Test phase reveals that C7 is plausible again. The corresponding action sequence (not depicted) was performed in 92 seconds, which is less than 135. So C7 is moved into the IM and gets a credit of 13 since it describes 13 programming steps (see Figure 10). This credit will be incremented by 13 each time the composite is plausible again.

9. Outlook

Further empirical analyses (in contrast to e.g. Elio & Scharf, 1990) of solutions and continuous action streams are in progress. The same is true for the *schema - based* help generation. When the PS is caught in an impasse for a task *j* it is possible to use our hypotheses testing approach. We generate a solution proposal to task *j* on the basis of schemata taken from the IM. These schemata represent the content of the hypothesis now generated by the IM and not by the user as before. Thus it is possible to offer help which uses episodic information and which was used by the PS successfully before.

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