



DFG Research Unit (FOR 1539)

Pre-prints of the DFG Research Unit "Horizontal Europeanization"

2014 - 01

# Actors and Dimensions of EU Affairs Professionalism

A topological review

*Sebastian M. Büttner, Lucia M. Leopold, Steffen Mau & Matthias Posvic*

---

DFG Research Unit *Horizontal Europeanization*

Fakultät I • Carl-von-Ossietzky-Universität Oldenburg • 26111 Oldenburg • Germany

Available online at [http://www.horizontal-europeanization.eu/downloads/preprints/PP\\_HoEu\\_2014-01\\_buettner\\_et\\_al\\_actors\\_dimensions\\_eu\\_professionalism.pdf](http://www.horizontal-europeanization.eu/downloads/preprints/PP_HoEu_2014-01_buettner_et_al_actors_dimensions_eu_professionalism.pdf)

*Abstract:* In this paper we conceptualize of the European Union (EU) as a field of professionalization and depict the emergence and various dimensions of what we call EU affairs professionalism. We argue that the European Union constitutes more than just a supranational layer of decision-making and an influential institutional complex of policy making, but is at the same time a pertinent and influential producer of expert knowledge, providing the basis for the emergence of specialized job profiles, professional careers, and working contexts. Although they usually act in the shadows and in the back rooms of EU policy making, these specialized groups of professionals make use of recognized expert knowledge, have access to specific resources, build up networks and collegial organizations, and exhibit expert authority in their particular domains of activity.

Drawing on social field theory and on current approaches to professionalism and professionalization, the paper scrutinizes the emerging transnational field of EU affairs professionalism in a topological manner, by distinguishing different arenas and types of professional involvement that characterize the ongoing professionalization of contemporary EU affairs. In this way, we aim to go beyond prevailing bureaucracy- and governance-centered views of EU policy making and to establish a broader and more differentiated image of the people who actually deal with EU affairs, who range from the major locations of EU policy making far into the EU member states and even beyond.

*Keywords:* professionalism; field analysis; transnational social field; EU affairs; European Union; EU professionals

# Table of Contents

1. Introduction .....	4
2. From existing governance-centered approaches in EU studies to a transnational field perspective .....	5
3. EU affairs as a transnational social field: occupational specialization and professionalization .....	7
4. A social topology of the transnational field of EU affairs professionalism .....	11
4.1 The organizational core of the field: Employment in EU institutions .....	12
4.2 In the back rooms of the organizational core: Commission agencies, committees, and expert groups.....	15
4.2.1 The mushrooming of decentralized and executive agencies since the mid-1990s.....	16
4.2.2 Actors in the thicket of EU decision-making: The EU comitology and the growth of expert groups.....	17
4.3 A vibrant job market at the doorways of EU institutions: Interest representation and lobbyism .....	19
4.4 Mediators and satellites of EU affairs: Growing EU professionalism within EU member states .....	22
5. EU affairs: An expanding transnational field of professionalization .....	24
References.....	26

## 1. Introduction

The current European (financial) crisis has reinforced perceptions of the European Union (EU) as a disentangled elite project. Observers frequently note the growing rift between more distant European politicians and technocrats and the major bulk of national citizenries. However, while the distance between the bureaucratic bodies of the EU and the national electorates has received huge attention (c.f. Majone 2005; Fligstein 2008; Haller 2008; Bach 2008; Eriksen 2009; Etzioni 2013), we still know very little about the people who actually “do” Europeanization in their daily professional lives. Until now the major part of research has focused on key actors, particularly powerful political actors and high-ranking public officials in the Brussels Bubble (Ross 1994; Page 1997; Shore 2000; Stevens and Stevens 2001; Hooghe 2001; Balint et al. 2008; Georgakakis 2011; McDonald 2012). Just recently, some political sociologists have started to explore the various social agents and arenas of “Eurocracy” in a broader perspective (Haller 2008: 152–198; Georgakakis 2009, 2011; Georgakakis and Rowell 2013). This article follows these new sociological attempts at EU studies and draws attention to the professionalization of EU-related areas of work and to job profiles within and beyond EU institutions in a wider, transnational scope.

We argue that the EU constitutes a vital field for a whole range of professional activities, both within and outside EU institutions and national public administrations, involved in EU policy making and other tasks that are subsumed nowadays under the heading of EU affairs.<sup>1</sup> However, although considerations of the expert-based character of supranational government were already part of early neofunctionalist thinking, we do not follow their path and consider expert knowledge as a source of social innovation. We rather see “professionalization” of EU affairs as a relatively self-referential process that establishes distinct EU-related standards, practices, and routines of professional activity (c.f. Meyer and Jepperson 2000; Scott 2008; Büttner 2012, 36 ff). Moreover, professionalization is related to the emergence of specific occupations, career paths and job profiles, distinct identities, and the tendency towards occupational closure and self-assertion, which go along with the attempt to establish status and authority and, ultimately, to define the field (c.f. Freidson 2001; Evetts 2008, 2013).

---

<sup>1</sup> The terms “EU affairs” and “European affairs” are directly derived from social practice. They are used in official job descriptions, newsletters, and study programs, and also in textbooks. Because of their common usage and wide circulation we decided to use the term “EU affairs” for the description of our particular field of study.

Our empirical analysis is based on a field-analytical perspective (Bourdieu 1998; Fligstein 2008; Fligstein and McAdam 2011). We suggest conceiving of EU affairs as a transnational field of professionalization that reaches far beyond the confined organizational structures of EU institutions. We aim to overcome simplistic and one-dimensional notions of EU elitism and to open the floor to a more differentiated view of EU affairs that draws attention to the growing complexities of EU policy making and to various forms of professionalism and professional activity in EU affairs, across Europe and even beyond. In the following, we start with a discussion of the existing research on EU governance and existing field analyses in EU studies. Subsequently, we introduce our conception of professionalization of EU affairs, which lays the ground for our empirical mapping of the field of EU-related professionalism. Cornerstones of our analysis are secondary analyses of the existing literature on EU-related tasks and occupations and document analyses, including the analysis of websites of networks and associations of EU professionals, and semistructured expert interviews conducted in winter of 2012–2013.

## **2. From existing governance-centered approaches in EU studies to a transnational field perspective**

The emergence of supranational bureaucratic structures and of the distinct technocratic character of European government has been a well-established topic in EU studies since the 1950s and 1960s (c.f. Haas 1958; Deutsch 1961). Notwithstanding the debates on the nature of the EU's government, there is broad consensus that the European Union constitutes an authority structure *sui generis* with multiple channels of influence and regulative power (c.f. Bach 2008; Fligstein 2008; Haller 2008). The EU has grown from a small administrative body that monitored the Community of Coal and Steel and the integration of the atomic industries in Germany and France during 1950s to a full-fledged governmental complex with extensive competences (Hix 1999; Wallace et al. 2010; Münch 2010). EU institutions, above all the European Commission and its adjunct administrative bodies, constitute powerful political actors in European politics and an extraordinarily powerful authority on policy making and government. It has the competence to propose legal acts, and it has acquired “epistemic authority” (Pierson 1994) in numerous fields of policy making. This implies that the Commission and its staff constantly produce and disseminate knowledge, standards, and various types of qualitative and quantitative data that are relevant to policy making in EU

member states. The EU institutions also bring together experts and policy makers from all over Europe in order to exchange ideas, knowledge, and practical experiences and propose expert interpretations and solutions to pressing challenges of government. Hence, sound scientific expertise and the competence to produce, understand, handle, and communicate scientific data are fundamental job requirements (Bach 2008; Shore 2000; Bernhard 2011).<sup>2</sup> Today, European institutions produce and prescribe standards, regulations, and policies requiring special knowledge on the part of those who are concerned with EU activities or interested in profiting from them. By issuing distinct policies and funding programs, EU institutions have not only established their own spheres of influence, but also have provided an opportunity structure for new actors as users, addressees, or potential clientele (Fligstein 2008; Bernhard 2011; Büttner 2012). This tendency is fostered by a trend towards governance by delegation, meaning that the preparation of political decision-making as well as subsequent regulatory tasks are increasingly delegated to expert groups and specialized committees, as well as to specialized regulatory agencies (Majone 1996; Bach 2008: 117 ff; Thatcher 2011). By the same token, there is an increasing Europeanization of politics, legislation, and public administration at national levels of policy making. This far-reaching Europeanization of public administration all around the territory of the current EU has been interpreted as the emergence of a European administrative space (Balint et al. 2008; Hofmann 2008; Levi-Faur 2011).

Various students of these complex structures of EU governance have highlighted the role of expertise (Majone 1996; Radaelli 1999), interest groups (Greenwood 2011), policy networks (Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999; Falkner 2000), and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1998) to account for the expert-based character of EU policy making. Moreover, the notion of epistemic communities, defined as networks of “professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992, 3) has gained prominence. This concept addresses the similarities among experts who are involved in the same policy area, such as shared stocks of knowledge, common beliefs, and even similar identities and self-understanding. It implies that EU policy making is performed by transnational communities of experts with similar educational and occupational backgrounds, sharing similar

---

<sup>2</sup>In fact, the Commission also has its own in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre (JRC), with different branches in Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain, which are targeted to many different areas of scientific research. In 2012 the JRC employed around 2,800 people. For more information see <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/> (accessed 07 June 2013).

perceptions of the world, a similar language, similar habitual practices, and thus a similar sense of problem solving as well.

Hence, EU integration has resulted in the rise of new specialized occupations beyond a confined circle of high-ranking public officials and related experts. The EU indeed constitutes a vital field of action for numerous experts, lobbyists, and related specialized occupational groups, both within and outside EU institutions and national public administrations, a distinct array of expert involvement and professional practice in EU-related affairs. However, this array widely exceeds the confined realms of EU policy making, and it also widely exceeds the spheres of expert communities, advocacy coalitions, and administrative elites in and around the Eurocracy in Brussels. Thus, we must go beyond existing policy- and governance-centered approaches in order to grasp the variety of EU-related expertise and professionalism to account for the rise and expansion of specialized EU-related occupations and professions in a wider sense. Accordingly, we would like to point attention to agent-based and field-theoretical approaches that have arisen in sociological EU studies in recent years (Kauppi 2005, 2011; Fligstein 2008; Bernhard 2011; Vauchez and Witte 2013). Against this backdrop, we propose to conceive of the growing expertization and professionalization of EU affairs as a growing transnational social field that extends from the centers of EU policy making in Brussels far into EU member states and even beyond.

### **3. EU affairs as a transnational social field: occupational specialization and professionalization**

Sociological field approaches in EU studies draw attention to the multifaceted social foundations and the contested nature of formal institutions. Moreover, they aim to provide a profound sociological account of agents, logics, and key drivers of Europeanization beyond (or beneath) official institution-building and political decision-making (Georgakakis and Weisbein 2010; Bernhard 2011; Kauppi 2011). According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), social fields can be regarded as social spaces in which social relations are fundamentally structured in terms of struggles for social recognition and social positioning, or as “configurations of objective relations” among various and unequal “social positions.” Hence, social fields fundamentally structure and orient actions and social relations in terms of struggles for symbolic and material resources. Certain rules of the game are established in social fields, defining and determining legitimate actions and structuring the distribution of

resources which are central to the positioning of actors (see also Bourdieu 1998; Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Kauppi 2011, 151 ff). Field research bridges classical dichotomies of social analysis, such as structure vs. agency, individual vs. collective, and rational vs. unconscious, and it provides leeway for a more differentiated analysis of actors and social groups carrying out EU integration, without presupposing unitary dispositions and aspirations (Georgakakis and Weisbein 2010, 94). At the same time, field research allows us to discover commonalities between actors in different places, which can be related to dispositions, social background, work experience, or the use of EU-specific knowledge (Büttner 2012).

One of the most prominent accounts of field research in contemporary EU studies is Neil Fligstein's (2008) work on the emergence and establishment of Europe-wide "fields of action." In his book *Euro-Clash*, he highlights the emergence of a European political field, Europe-wide fields of business activities, European fields of civic self-organization, and other distinctly European fields of action in everyday life that increasingly overlies and affect respective established national fields (Fligstein 2008). The field approach has also been put forward by French political sociologists, especially by scholars of the Center for European Political Sociology (CEPS) in Strasbourg and related scholars (c.f. Kauppi 2005; Mérand 2008; Vauchez 2008; Georgakakis 2009; Cohen 2011). These researchers have produced insightful ethnographies of the emergence and professionalization of new European political elites, such as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), EU judges, and civil servants of the EU Commission. The Strasbourg scholars particularly focused on the institutionalization of typical career paths, occupational roles, power resources, and hierarchies in European political fields, and on the "professional turf wars" (Kauppi 2011, 161) among various social groups, such as representatives of national governments, lawyers, and civil servants of the EU Commission. In this context, the work of Didier Georgakakis and colleagues must be highlighted, as it is highly instructive for the elaboration of a field analytical account of the professionalization of EU affairs.

In fact, Georgakakis and colleagues have provided a notable account of biographies, career pathways, and the particular skills and competences of high-ranking public officials and other professional staff of the "Eurocracy" (Georgakakis 2007, 2009). Based upon Bourdieu's theory of capital, Georgakakis and his collaborators spelled out typical power resources and dispositions of high-ranking public officials, such as highly developed linguistic skills and



other types of cultural capital, and they introduced the distinction between “political” and “technical” (or “sector”) capital to account for the variety of skills and job specialization within the EU administration. Furthermore, they scrutinized typical careers and groups of professionals in the immediate surroundings of EU institutions, i.e., permanent representatives of EU member states, experts, lobbyists, representatives of trade unions, and the like (Georgakakis and Rowell 2013), and they analyzed new forms of political mobilization “from below” as well as the increasing specialization of local French authorities in EU policy making (Georgakakis and Weisbein 2010; Lassalle 2010).

Given these extensive accounts, we understand EU affairs as a growing field of professionalization, and we argue that the expansion of the field is directly linked to the growing complexity of policy making in general and the particular epistemic character of EU governance. However, in contrast to Georgakakis and colleagues, who are still very much focused on EU institutions or “the Eurocracy” (Georgakakis and Rowell 2013) in the narrow sense, we claim with Fligstein (2008) that EU affairs constitutes a transnational field of action. Thus, we draw on both strands of the aforementioned literature in our conception of field analysis, because in our view there is a wide social space of EU-related professional activities embracing very diverse groups and individuals, all dealing in one way or the other with EU-related issues. This field is certainly not fully established yet, in the sense that the rules of the game are not yet clear-cut and fixed. Rather we see it as a field in the making, or rather as a “weak field” (Vauchez 2008), which is highly fragmented and stratified depending on the degree of involvement, access to the major resources, and the possession or the use of information and knowledge. The status of professionals also strongly varies with their occupational positioning and their proximity to major sites of decision-making and with the uneven distribution of the various symbolic, social, and material power resources, or rather, of various types of “capital.” And since the social structure of the field is by no means fixed, competition, power struggles, and struggles of establishment and positioning within the field are vital elements of social dynamics of the field of EU affairs, in particular by means of occupational specialization and, more particularly, professionalization.

Professionalization is usually regarded as a distinct “third logic” of social self-organization, next to other logics such as free-market competition and bureaucratic organization (Freidson 2001). It is also understood as a way of social positioning of a certain occupational group with some degree of autonomy and power to define and control the major rules and

standards in its own right (Abbott 1988; Burrage and Thorstendahl 1990). Thus, the pivotal issue of successful professionalization is usually seen in the establishment of a distinct and recognized profession with an autonomous legal status and its own regulative competences. Part of it can be the establishment and definition of certain standards of qualification and the emergence of professional associations monitoring the conduct of actual and potential members of a profession, which usually entails a clear distinction between members of a profession and nonmembers (laypersons or so-called amateurs).

In our own conception of professionalization with respect to EU affairs, we do not go so far as to claim the emergence and establishment of one particular or even various original EU professions. Rather, first and foremost, we conceive of professionalization as a fairly contingent and relatively open process of social positioning in a particular field of occupation that mainly comprises professional activities, and that is fundamentally structured by the cultural resources that are usually attributed to experts and professionals (i.e., different types of *epistemes* and expert knowledge in the form of legal texts, policy proposals, statistics, management knowledge, etc.). Hence, in line with the current literature on “new professions,” our conception of professionalization is not categorical, but is practice-based and linked to attributes of “professionalism” (Evetts 2008, 2013). Accordingly, we consider professionalism to be a concept that is culturally highly valued and coined normatively in a particular way. Namely, it is attributed to the conduct of “knowledge-based work,” especially in marked distinction to mundane practices or “mere” mechanical occupations (Meyer and Jepperson 2000; Scott 2008). Following Pavalko (1988, 17 ff), we conceptualize professionalization as a process that oscillates on a continuum between mere laymanship and elaborate professionalism. The level of professionalization and respective degree of professionalism of the actors concerned is marked by such different attributes as degree of specialization, complexity and elaborateness of expertise, amount and content of training, and also by such crucial sociological attributes as the competence to perform professionalism convincingly and the degree of influence and prestige. Hence, growing specialization is the condition for further attempts at social positioning through professionalization. We argue, accordingly, that the expansion of the transnational field of EU affairs professionalism is directly linked to the growing complexity of policy making in general and to the particular epistemic character of EU governance. Indeed, the EU, or

rather, EU policy making, provides numerous resources and opportunities for expert involvement and professionalization.

#### **4. A social topology of the transnational field of EU affairs professionalism**

In the following, we present a sketch of the transnational field of EU affairs, focusing on the questions of where professionalized or at least specialized expert occupations can be found, what these people do, and how to characterize their particular type of professionalism. Hence, we aim to provide an account of the extent, the quantities, and the degree of professional involvement in EU affairs, and we show that the EU has become a dynamic field of occupational specialization and an important area of employment for young academics and different types of professionals. We have organized the description in concentric circles, moving from the core of power and involvement in EU government to the margins of the field. We claim that the European Union does not constitute just one particular (European) field of action, but consists of many different social fields, with a transnational (usually Europe-wide) reach, of which EU affairs is just one field among others. However, it is important to note that the field of EU affairs professionalism is not just “European” or linked solely to a certain substantial or imagined supranational spatial layer, such as “Brussels” or “the EU-level,” and it is not just “political” or primarily focused on political decision-making. Rather it flexibly interlinks individuals and occupational groups from a vast array of disciplinary backgrounds and from different places all around Europe and beyond under the heading of common European, or EU-specific, affairs. Certainly, in the core of the field we can locate key positions and key actors of EU government, such as high-ranking public officials of the EU Commission, certain key politicians, and some commissioners themselves. More at the margins of the field, we can find people who are only indirectly or temporarily involved in EU policy making, but who are employed as experts or professionals in certain EU-related matters. Thus, the boundaries of the field are not permanently fixed; rather, they should be considered as dynamic zones of inclusion and exclusion. The *sine qua non* of involvement in the field, nonetheless, is the occupational status and the level of professional involvement of a person in EU affairs. Hence, each field participant must be involved in one or the other way in EU affairs professionally—be it on a permanent or temporary contract; as a national or local public official dealing with EU affairs; or as a freelancer, trainee, part-

time worker, expert, or consultant. This is the bottom line that distinguishes participants in the field of EU affairs from outsiders.

#### **4.1 The organizational core of the field: Employment in EU institutions**

Without any doubt, the core institutions of the European Union located in Brussels and elsewhere constitute major hubs of professional involvement in EU affairs. Many of the specialized jobs dealing with EU affairs are directly situated within one of the few major institutional spots of contemporary EU government: the EU Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the European Central Bank. These EU institutions offer attractive working conditions for academically trained professionals from various disciplines. The jobs are highly prestigious, well paid, and permanent. According to EU information provided at the end of 2012, about 44,500 people were employed in EU institutions in official posts, mostly on permanent contracts (about 95% of all posts). The remaining 5% were temporary posts for specific manual or administrative tasks of a duration of six to twelve months (see Table 1 below). The access to employment in EU institutions is highly limited, standardized, and subject to highly competitive selection processes, above all the famous *concours* (Georgakakis 2009, 7). Most of the career pathways in EU institutions are regulated by clear-cut selection criteria and bureaucratic prescriptions, and usually there are national quotas on all positions, according to the size of EU member states (Bach 2008, 99–116; Haller 2008, 160 ff).<sup>3</sup>

Until 2003, each of the various EU institutions had its own personnel selection policies. In January 2003, however, the selection of staff was restructured and centralized; since then, it has been in the hands of the so-called European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO). The foundation of the EPSO can be seen as a clear step towards further standardization and regulation of access to EU institutions. In principle, the EPSO offers two different types of entry and career options for (mostly permanent) positions in EU institutions that are not appointed politically: (1) there are advertisements for “entry-level positions,” addressed to university leavers and young graduates, and (2) a pathway exists for “graduates with work experience” as well as “administrative personnel” and “experienced professionals.” The

---

<sup>3</sup> However, it must be noted as well that many high-ranking positions and senior level appointments are filled via so-called *parachutage* (Bach 2008, 111), meaning that they are not filled via official selection processes, but through interventions of national governments and high-ranking offices of EU institutions, which is common staffing practice in many international organizations, but less so in EU institutions (Bach 2008, 110 ff).

various job profiles for employment in EU institutions are specified by the EPSO as follows: first and foremost, regular policy officers, working in the European Public Administration and in the European External Action Service (External Relations); lawyers, economists and statisticians, auditors, and communication officers, as well as financial managers and financial assistants. Moreover, the European Union also employs numerous language professionals (about 6,200),<sup>4</sup> such as translators, conference interpreters, language editors, and lawyer-linguists. It also offers employment opportunities for information technology specialists (ICT staff) and other support staff, such as secretaries, administrative assistants, and human resource assistants. Support staff such as cleaners, facility managers, security staff, secretaries, and administrative assistants work for EU institutions, but are certainly not part of the field of EU affairs. The same is true for most of the thousands of language professionals. Indeed, they might be dealing with EU matters, but they usually do not take any active role in EU affairs.

There is also another important distinction to be made between executive staff and political posts. High-ranking political officeholders, politicians, and influential political brokers who are not necessarily part of the official staff of EU institutions are undoubtedly most central to the field of EU affairs. Some of the political posts are central, since they hold top chairs in the official structures of EU policy making. Moreover, national politicians and high-ranking national policy makers can also be very central to the field, although they are not constantly involved in European affairs. Other top-ranking professional groups are the members of the European Parliament, the 27 commissioners of the European Commission, the staff of their personal offices, the so-called cabinets, and the heads of the 33 administrative units of the EU Commission, the so-called Directorates-General or DGs (Georgakakis 2009, 2011; Bach 2008, 95 ff).

The European Commission is one of the most central and by far is also the largest body of professional employment within the current system of EU government (see Table 1). The largest part of employment within the Commission, and within all EU institutions, is constituted by policy officers and other administrative staff members of the Directorates-General. They can be considered the quiet agents or prototypes of EU affairs professionalism. They have a prestigious and established position, they have access to

---

<sup>4</sup> This is the total amount of all linguist support staff of the Commission (interpreters, freelance interpreters and support staff of the Commission's interpretation service). Data provided by the EPSO at [http://europa.eu/epso/discover/job\\_profiles/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/epso/discover/job_profiles/index_en.htm) (accessed: 28 June 2013).

information and decision-making, and they personify the *esprit de corps* of the EU government, in terms of their education and their habitual practices.<sup>5</sup>

The standards for employment are relatively high, and the staff of the Commission constitutes a highly specialized and distinctive group of professionals. A typical policy officer is someone who possesses one or even two degrees in relevant subject areas (economics, political sciences, EU law, management studies, or other relevant epistemic fields); speaks three or four different languages; has decent intercultural knowledge; and already has some practical EU-related work experience before entering the Commission (Bach 2008, 109). A degree from one of the elite universities in Europe or the United States and an international biography are advantageous for employment in the Commission, although the EU administrative staff is less selective than employment in high offices within some national contexts, such as, for instance, the typical Oxbridge link to the civil services in Great Britain or an *École nationale d'administration* (ENA) education in the French context. However, there is strong linkage with the College of Europe in Bruges and Warsaw, Europe's leading postgraduate education institution of EU affairs. The College of Europe was founded in 1948 and has acted since then, and especially since the mid-1970s, as an important engine of professionalization of EU affairs (Schnabel 1998; Michel 2006; Poehls 2009). In the past two decades there has been a general increase in graduate studies offering degrees in European studies, European affairs, European law, and European management. These programs have played a vital role in the preparation and training of young professionals for Europe. (For the expansion of European studies in Germany, see Beichelt et al. 2013.)

Table 1 provides an outline of all current official posts and positions in EU bureaucracy, i.e., in all institutions and administrative bodies that are officially part of the institutional complex that constitutes the European Union. It can be seen that the second-largest body of employment after the EU Commission is the European Parliament. It has 754 elected members in total, and they are supported by an administrative and academic staff of about 6,650 employees. The third-largest body in terms of employment within EU bureaucracy is the European Council, with about 3,150 people, mainly policy officers from member states and other specialized administrative staff. Employing 27 judges and a staff of 2,065 employees in total, the European Court of Justice is the fourth-largest EU institution in terms

---

<sup>5</sup> At the same time, the administrative corps of the Commission has grown substantially. In 1980, for instance, the Commission consisted of only some 11,900 employees. In 1990, the number of employees was about 16,700. And most notably, after EU enlargement in 2004, the number has grown substantially, up to 24,000 (source: Official Journal of the European Communities, 2004).

of employment, and is certainly another highly influential player in contemporary EU government (Münch 2010; Vauchez and Witte 2013).<sup>6</sup>

*Table 1: Employees European Union 2012 by institutions*

Institution	EU – employees		Total	%
	Permanent posts	Temporary posts		
European Commission	24617	448	25065	56.2
<i>Administration</i>	18926	364	19290	43.3
<i>R&amp;D Dep.</i>	3827	-	3827	8.6
<i>Other</i>	1742	84	1826	4.1
European Parliament	5509	1144	6653	14.9
European Council and Council	3117	36	3153	7.1
Court of Justice of the European Union	1547	405	1952	4.4
Court of Auditors	752	135	887	2.0
European Economic and Social Committee	689	35	724	1.6
Committee of the Regions	488	43	531	1.2
European Ombudsman	22	44	66	0.1
European Data Protection Supervisor	43	-	43	0.1
European External Action Service	1667	3	1670	3.7
European Central Bank	n.s.	n.s.	1638	3.7
European Investment Bank	n.s.	n.s.	1950	4.4
European Investment Fund	n.s.	n.s.	230	0.5
<b>Total N</b>			<b>44562</b>	<b>100</b>

Sources: Official Journal of the European Union, 2012/70/EU, Euratom, S. 117.

EIB: Online self-presentation, available at: <http://www.eib.europa.eu/about/index.htm> (Accessed 31.05.2013);

Ecb: Jahresbericht 2012, S.183, <http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/annrep/ar2012de.pdf> (Accessed 31.05.2013);

EIF: Online self-presentation, available at: <http://www.eif.org/jobs/index.htm> (Accessed 31.05.2013).

## 4.2 In the back rooms of the organizational core: Commission agencies, committees, and expert groups

Professional engagement in EU affairs is by far not only confined to the core EU institutions. On the contrary, EU policy making is highly dependent on the work of agencies, committees, experts, and other consultative bodies to which decision-making and policy implementation are increasingly delegated. This trend underlines the strong technocratic character of EU

<sup>6</sup> For a description of other groups of employees in EU institutions, such as the staff of the European Central Bank, see Georgakakis and Rowell 2013.

government and the increasing importance of professionalized expertise in EU policy implementation (Pollack 2003; Bach 2008, 117 ff; Thatcher 2011). To illustrate this trend, in the following we briefly address the development of Commission agencies, committees, and expert groups.

#### **4.2.1 The mushrooming of decentralized and executive agencies since the mid-1990s**

In the 1990s there was a substantial boom of agencies in the system of EU governance (Majone 1996). These agencies are set up to implement EU policies in technical terms and support EU decision-making by pooling special knowledge and expertise from both the EU institutions and from national authorities in all important EU policy areas, ranging from the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX) to the European Railway Agency (ERA) and the European Defence Agency (EDA). Thus, this so-called agencification (Levi-Faur 2011, 814) of EU policy making is not an epiphenomenon, but stretches across all policy regimes of the EU (see also Groenleer 2009; Rittberger and Wonka 2011), mirroring the trend in EU policy making towards growing expert involvement and delegation of policy implementation. In fact, although there were only two EU agencies before 1990, there are now more than 40 agencies in place in 2013 (36 so-called decentralized agencies, 6 executive agencies, and the 2 older agencies and bodies supporting the aims of the EURATOM treaty), employing more than 5,000 people in headquarters and offices dispersed all around the EU territory.<sup>7</sup> Since the staff of these organizations usually exhibits a high level of “technical” competence in the respective policy areas (“sectoral capital”) and proven management skills (“organizational capital”), they have gained influence on EU policy making in the course of increasing agencification, ranging through all levels of the respective organizations (see Groenleer 2009, 120 ff). Employment is usually organized on a temporary basis, with a high chance that a person will be prolonged or even permanently employed, though this last option is capped at a maximum of 20% of the staff by the Commission, leaving most of the staff in a quasi-permanent position by continuous prolongation, in order to reduce the costs of brain drain. The staff is usually recruited by the agencies themselves, independent of the European Union Personal

---

<sup>7</sup> This also an indication that EU policy making is not concentrated at one concrete location of power such as Brussels, for instance, but increasingly is decentralized. For an overview of all existing agencies, see [http://europa.eu/agencies/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/agencies/index_en.htm) (accessed 21 June 2013).



Selection Office. Through collective interest representation, such as the Assembly of Agency Staff Committees (AASC),<sup>8</sup> these agencies have also gathered some autonomy. Moreover, the boards and executive directors of the agencies can act highly autonomously, as long as they keep in line with the establishment plan of the agency and report regularly to the Parliament.

#### **4.2.2 Actors in the thicket of EU decision-making: The EU comitology and the growth of expert groups**

Apart from the growth of technical expertise in EU policy implementation, there is also a trend towards delegation of and expert involvement in EU decision-making. Specialized committees and expert groups are involved in all stages of decision-making processes. Almost all policy proposals and legislative acts are prepared, approved, or at least discussed in one or many committees and expert groups appointed by the Council of the European Union, the EU Commission, or the European Parliament. Apart from the official political committees of the European Union, such as the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, there are a number of other consultative committees that also belong to the complex system of EU decision-making: the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper); the so-called comitology committees; the Employment Committee; the Political and Security Committee (PSC); and, similar to national parliaments, a large number of parliamentary committees.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, there are numerous additional expert groups providing input and specialized expertise on all topics of EU policy making.

While the role of Coreper, which is made up of high-ranking representatives of member states preparing the work of the Council of the European Union, is pretty clear, the role and the composition of comitology committees and expert groups are often less transparent. Often these two different kinds of consultative bodies—comitology committees and expert groups—are mixed up and are considered equally as elements of the so-called comitology system of the EU Commission, since both bodies are part of the institutional complex of decision-making of the EU Commission and both are appointed by individual DGs of the EU Commission (Haller 2008, 186). However, there is a marked difference: only the comitology committees belong to the official consultative process of decision-making, which is officially

---

<sup>8</sup> See <http://ew.eea.europa.eu/aasc> (accessed 21 June 2013).

<sup>9</sup> See [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/glossary/experts\\_committees\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/experts_committees_en.htm) (23 August 2013).

called “comitology.” Accordingly, the comitology committees, of which 310 were in place in 2013,<sup>10</sup> are *de jure* part of the political system of the EU.<sup>11</sup> They consist of highly specialized representatives of national government who are familiar with the respective policy area and represent the position of national governments during the preparation of legislation (European Commission 2012). Hence, while the comitology committees are quite central to the field of EU affairs, the members of comitology committees are usually more linked to national fields of power than to European fields. Still, they contribute to the Europeanization of social fields by defining standards and concepts and the establishment of distinctly European, or rather, EU-related, epistemic communities.

The Commission’s expert groups, in turn, are consultative bodies that are set up to provide the European Commission and its DGs with special knowledge in very specific areas of policy making during the preparation of legislative proposals, policy initiatives, and delegated acts, or during the implementation of existing EU legislation and policies. However, they do not have any official political voice or mandate, and the members of the expert groups are neither officially employed nor officially paid by the Commission or other EU bodies. As the name indicates, these groups consist of experts in all possible areas of EU policy making and vary from group to group, but include representatives and specialists of national authorities and also people from academia, private consultants, and representatives of corporations and trade unions and other interest groups (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008, 727; Huster 2008, 29).

Hence, the individual members are neither necessarily EU affairs professionals in strict terms, nor do they constantly belong to the field of EU affairs. However, involvement in one of the expert groups can substantially contribute to the socialization of individuals into EU affairs and into the Commission’s peculiar system of policy making. Sometimes, members of expert groups can directly transfer their particular “technical” and “expertise capital” into employment in EU affairs, since managing bodies of the aforementioned EU agencies, for instance, often comprise members of former expert groups who have suggested the establishment of a respective agency. Consequently, the existing structures of EU decision-

---

<sup>10</sup> See <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm> (23 August 2013).

<sup>11</sup> In fact, before 2011 about 98% of all EU legislation was discussed in one or more comitology committee. However, it must be noted that with the enforcement of the so-called Lisbon Treaty, adopted in 2009, the notion of comitology has disappeared as an official legal definition (Guéguen 2013, 55 ff).

making are also strongly criticized by critical observers.<sup>12</sup> Both the comitology committees and the expert groups are seen as the gateways of excessive lobbyism, and criticism has been made that the Commission often does not provide decent information on the composition and internal discussions of many of the committees and expert groups. In fact, even though there is an official *EU Register of Commission Expert Groups and Other Similar Entities*, the information provided there is not up-to-date and is rather incomplete.<sup>13</sup> Hence, the participants and also the exact number of expert groups are unknown. It is estimated, nonetheless, that there are at least 1,200 expert groups in place, adding up to supposedly over 50,000 members. It is alleged that the number of expert groups has more than doubled since the mid-1970s (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008).

### **4.3 A vibrant job market at the doorways of EU institutions: Interest representation and lobbyism**

Apart from employment in EU institutions and related bodies and agencies, since the 1990s, interest representation and lobbyism have become a vital field of activity for experts and trained professionals in EU affairs (Lahusen and Jauss 2001; Eising 2008; Beyers et al. 2008; Greenwood 2011; Klüver 2013). In fact, along with the worldwide diffusion of role models of special interest organizations from the United States and lobbying specialists and the expansion of consulting services since 1980s, interest representation and lobbyism have generally become booming businesses and vital elements of policy making all over the European continent, and not only in EU politics (Mahoney 2008; Baumgartner et al. 2009). Consequently, because of the importance of delegated decision-making and because of the high specificity and technical character of the subject matter of EU policy making, interest representation and lobbyism play an important role in EU decision-making.

Interest representation and lobbyism constitute a wide, partly unstructured arena of various actors, organizations, and activities. At EU level they range from activities of official interest groups and interest associations (so-called sectoral groups), such as trade unions and other official membership organizations; through special interest groups, pressure groups, and public interest groups; to nongovernmental organizations, citizen groups, and social movements (“causal groups”). There is also a growing number of individual consultants and

---

<sup>12</sup> See, for instance, numerous statements and reports of the so-called “Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation” (ALTER-EU) at <http://www.alter-eu.org> (accessed 26 July 2013) and Guéguen (2013).

<sup>13</sup> See <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=search.result> (accessed 06 June 2013).

larger consultancies offering specialized lobbying or public communication services to various individuals, organizations, and also to interest groups (Lahusen 2002; Coen and Richardson 2009; Greenwood 2011; Klüver and Saurugger 2013).

Because of the multifaceted nature of interest representation and lobbying activities, there are no precise data available on the quantity of EU-related interest organizations and their employees, but it is estimated that about 15,000 to 30,000 people are involved full-time in this business (Graziano 2010). However, not all of these employees are based in Brussels. According to the lobbyist Daniel Guéguen (2007, 20 ff), only about one third of the full-time employees solely worked in Brussels; the other two thirds were still based in the member states. Moreover, Guéguen also argues that the numbers of people who are professionally involved in EU affairs for interest representation is much higher when one also takes the “half-time lobbyists” into account, i.e., all public affairs professionals offering services to various “customers.” Hence, there is a huge variance in estimations and measurements of interest representation, depending on respective definitions of interest organizations, and depending on the respective data set and the scope of analyses. Thus, the number of organizations that are considered to be EU-related interest organizations ranges between 2,500 (Berkhout and Lowery 2010) and 3,700 (Wonka et al. 2010, 369) up to almost 6,000 organizations and associations, as indicated in the transparency register of the EU Parliament and the EU Commission.<sup>14</sup> In June 2013 there were 5,755 registrants in the register, divided in the following subcategories: (1) professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants (677 registrants); (2) in-house lobbyists and trade/professional associations (2,864); (3) nongovernmental organizations, platforms, networks, and similar (1,496); (4) think tanks, research and academic institutions (406); (5) organizations representing churches and religious communities (38); and (6) organizations representing local, regional, and municipal authorities, other public or mixed entities, etc. (274).

Yet, apart from the problems of estimating the quantity, two major trends in EU-related interest representation can be pointed out: first, a significant expansion of actors and organizations between the 1980s and the beginning of 2000, with a bias towards business actors as well as nongovernmental organizations; and, second, an overall commercialization and professionalization, regardless of the type and background of the interest organization (Lahusen and Jauss 2001; Lahusen 2002; Mahoney 2008; Klüver and Saurugger 2013; Van

---

<sup>14</sup> See <http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/> (accessed 19 June 2013). However, since registration in the register is voluntary, the numbers provided in the register are far from being representative.

Schendelen 2013). For the NGO and civil society scene, this professionalization was not entirely a bottom-up process: it was also fostered and facilitated by the EU itself. Today, interest groups and interest organizations normally hire specialized lobbying professionals, such as lawyers, communication specialists, accountants, and public affairs managers. This strong wave of professionalization is also reflected in the growing number of commercial consultancies, private think tanks, and so-called self-made lobbyists, who formerly worked as journalists, representatives of a larger interest organization as high-ranking public officials, or in other positions in the EU administration.

Our analysis of two major online job newsletters offering “EU jobs” on a weekly basis can confirm the assumption of a substantial job market and an ongoing professionalization of EU-related interest representation.<sup>15</sup> Job newsletters specializing in EU affairs advertise weekly around 30 to 40 jobs in different sectors, ranging from large companies and industry organizations to nongovernmental organizations, policy agencies, and think tanks. They are constantly looking for employees for their “European affairs department” in Brussels or in individual EU member states. The most typical job denominations occurring in these newsletters are public affairs consultant, EU policy and planning officer, EU campaigner, communications manager, external affairs manager, EU affairs executive, public affairs accounting manager, EU policy advisor, EU lawyer, and European legal advisor. The respective job descriptions typically outline the following requirements, representing a mix of EU-specific expertise and general competencies: completed academic education, excellent language skills in English and another EU language, knowledge of EU decision-making processes, experience in monitoring and drafting policy proposals and press releases, and communication and networking skills. Similarly, it has been underlined that a new, more professionalized generation of people has now fully taken over in Brussels (Guéguen 2007; Van Schendelen 2013). However, as Lahusen (2013, 190 ff) points out, the strong drive of professionalization of EU-related interest representation has until now neither led to the development of a regulated and exclusive labor market of EU affairs professionals, nor to a uniform development of a distinct profession of European public affairs. The field is vibrant, indeed, but it remains fairly unregulated and semiprofessionalized. There is a fluent passage among interest representation, lobbying, general consulting services, PR, and journalism.

---

<sup>15</sup> Based on an analysis of the two most popular job newsletters in EU affairs, *Brusselsjobs* and *Euractiv*, during the period May 2012 to May 2013; see <http://www.brusselsjobs.com> and <http://www.jobs.euractiv.com> (accessed 9 August 2013).

#### **4.4 Mediators and satellites of EU affairs: Growing EU professionalism within EU member states**

Specialized expertise in EU affairs is also increasingly required in local, regional, and national administrations and in other professional organizations, especially since these days EU legislation influences roughly 60% and sometimes even more of national legislation (Bach 2008, 117; Trondal and Peters 2012, 5 ff). Consequently, national, regional, and local administrations; universities; and other governmental organizations increasingly recruit people with particular knowledge of, or at least some basic competences in, EU affairs (Lassalle 2010). Haller (2008, 166) has roughly estimated the number of official posts in national administrations mainly dealing with EU affairs to be between 17,900 and 36,200 people.

Moreover, in recent years more and more national and subnational actors and organizations have started to focus on EU affairs by establishing their own departments for EU affairs or even opening up their own liaison office in Brussels, and they also have become members of specialized European associations and networks in order to be up-to-date in EU affairs. An even larger part of the job market for EU affairs professionals and related expertise is created by EU funding. Funds not only provide resources; they also come along with a specific script of “how to do things” (Büttner 2012), which in many instances requires special expertise, fund-specific knowledge, and knowledge of the particular EU literacy. The areas of funding are very different, as they range from funding of research, development, education, and environmental protection to funding of consumer protection, energy, and transport, or EU external assistance. Beneficiaries of these funds can be national and regional authorities in the EU member states, as well as public or private organizations and legal entities such as universities, colleges, businesses, interest groups, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

The EU funding system generates employment opportunities for people with EU expertise in areas like EU fundraising, managing funds, implementing, and evaluating and coordinating EU-funded projects and programs at European, national, regional, and even local levels. Moreover, there are EU co-financed information and consultancy networks such as, e.g., the Enterprise Europe Network, which maintains about 600 focal points in over 40 countries

worldwide, in order to advise small business on accessing EU funding and finding international business partners for EU projects.<sup>16</sup>

Besides public service–providing institutions, there are also increasingly private consultancies specialized in advising managing authorities as well as beneficiaries. They provide information on funding opportunities and criteria for success, and they support beneficiaries in the procedures of writing project applications and evaluating projects appropriate to the EU guidelines. Beneficiaries of EU funds also increasingly employ these specialized experts for the preparation and submission of EU project applications. Hence, EU funds generate a wide range of employment opportunities for people working in EU projects. Much of these people’s work is project-based, in accordance with the employment prescriptions of EU funding. Moreover, since EU projects are often based on transnational cooperation, the specialized experts need to build up and foster networks with relevant—often foreign—partners. Therefore, they are also expected to be able to work in multicultural settings and to regularly cooperate with project partners in other countries.

However, experts employed in the area of EU funding not only have to have general project management and organization skills, but also knowledge about the EU governance system, EU funding guidelines, and the peculiarities of EU funding programs. This increasing demand for experts in EU funding is accompanied by an increase of specialized training and study programs focusing on the conveyance of specific skills and competences regarding the acquisition, application, evaluation, billing, and budgeting of EU projects. Beyond that, private companies have started to offer specialized training and official certificates for EU fundraisers, EU funds managers, and EU project managers, and this trend is also accompanied by the establishment of professional associations of EU fundraisers, both on European and national levels, struggling for official recognition and aiming to set professional standards for this occupational area.<sup>17</sup> These are clear indications of professionalization, and this underlines once more that EU affairs has become a vibrant field of professionalization, in which various experts with very different career pathways and biographies try to distinguish themselves from others and attempt to establish status by creating new occupational identities and job profiles.

---

<sup>16</sup> See <http://een.ec.europa.eu/about/mission> (accessed August 2013).

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, the training offers of EMCRA and Euro-Consult, two private EU-related consulting companies located in Berlin, at <http://akademie.emcra.eu/> and <http://www.euroconsults.eu/> (accessed 9 September 2013).

## 5. EU affairs: An expanding transnational field of professionalization

In this article we have shed light on major locations and areas of the professionalization of EU expertise. Using the toolkit of field theory, we were interested in the patterns and dynamics of professional work that are occupied with EU affairs. The field perspective has helped us to conceive of the professionalization of EU affairs as a dynamic and discontinuous process within which different types of actors and professionals strive for social recognition and establishment, attempt to (re)define how things should be done, and start to regulate access to the field and requirements for participation, albeit still at a comparatively modest level. We have demonstrated that EU integration has proliferated EU expertise and EU professionalism. In our view, the EU indeed constitutes an “epistemic authority” (Pierson 1994) for its immediate surroundings, setting standards, codes, and agendas, and defining problems to be solved and topics to be worked upon, wherein EU professionals may act as brokers and interlocutors of EU business. EU affairs increasingly constitute a distinct area of professional activities that are by far not only confined to the activities of EU institutions and their direct surroundings, but reaches deeply into all EU member states and beyond.

In light of our topological review of major loci and professionals of EU affairs, we think that it is clearly justified to talk about an emerging transnational field of EU affairs professionalism. This trend towards professionalization is characterized by changes in the role of knowledge and expertise, by new types of job descriptions and career tracks, as well as by professional self-organization. However, we do not suggest that the field has properly defined borders, established rules of the game, a fixed set of actors, or is highly institutionalized, but suggest that it is appropriate to speak of a “weak field” (Vauchez 2008), meaning that it, as a transnational field, overlaps with national fields and has relatively blurred and still porous borders.

The drive toward professionalization happens both “from within,” i.e., is determined by the occupational group itself, and also from above, related to forces from outside (Evetts 2013, 786). The former is part and parcel of the interest of professionals themselves: just think of career and income opportunities, recognition, or the acquisition of power in the field, the latter having heavily influenced the process of European integration. Moreover, since EU institutions traditionally rely on highly specialized staff, we have also witnessed the growth of numbers of personnel, a tighter definition of the job requirements, and an elaboration of



a recruitment policy that fosters a trend towards professionalization of EU staff. This is particularly underlined by the foundation of training centers closely interlinked with a career in EU institutions, such as the College of Europe and similar national training programs.

However, we have also seen that there is neither one dominant type of professionalism within the field of EU affairs, nor do professionals of EU affairs constitute a coherent and exclusive group. On the contrary, even though EU professionals certainly do have some commonalities, we have found a whole range of different types of actors and areas of specialization. These include politicians and related political brokers with various types of national and European political capital and networks; different variants of executive employees and technical experts with little political capital, but with a high degree of special knowledge and expertise (i.e., “technical” or “sectoral” capital, but also specialized policy knowledge and distinct management skills); the growing importance of information brokers, communication specialists, and public affairs professionals in the area of interest representation exhibiting, in varying degrees, a mixture of political and technical capital and a great deal of networking and communication skills, which can hardly be learned through training, but must be acquired in practice. And, finally, there is also a growing number of professional information brokers and service providers specialized on the acquisition, management, and imparting of EU funds, such as EU project managers and EU fundraisers. These types of professionals are usually neither politically active in EU affairs, nor do they work in the centers of the Eurocracy, but often are entirely in local and national contexts. However, they are a vital element of EU affairs, since they translate EU knowledge into local knowledge and bring EU resources to potential beneficiaries who are often not familiar with the EU at all.

Whether this is the case or not, whether this actually leads to a broadening and deepening of European integration, or to its opposite, a stronger decoupling of European affairs, remains an open question and a subject of further research. In our view, however, it is necessary to account for these questions as a matter of professionalization and as a struggle of various social groups and actors over resources and social recognition, rather than conceiving of the agents of Europe as a unitary social class and of European integration as a unitary elite project.

## References

- Abbott, A. (1988) *The System of Professions. An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bach, M. (2008) *Europa Ohne Gesellschaft. Politische Soziologie der Europäischen Integration*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
- Balint, T., Bauer, M. W. and Knill, C. (2008) 'Bureaucratic change in the European administrative space: The case of the European commission', *West European Politics* 31(4): 677–700.
- Baumgartner, F. R., Berry, J. M., Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D. C. and Leech, B. L. (2009) *Lobbying and Policy Change. Who wins, who loses, and why*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Beichelt, T., Choluj, B., Rowe, G. and Wagener, H.-J. (ed.) (2013): *Europa-Studien. Eine Einführung*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
- Berkhout, J. and Lowery, D. (2008) 'Counting Organized Interests in the European Union: a Comparison of Data Sources', *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(4): 489-513.
- Berkhout, J. and Lowery, D. (2010) 'The changing demography of the EU interest system since 1990', *European Union Politics* 11(3): 447-61.
- Bernhard, S. (2011) 'Beyond Constructivism - The Political Sociology of an EU Policy Field', *International Political Sociology* 5(4): 426–45.
- Beyers, J., Eising, R. and Maloney, W. (2008) 'Researching Interest Group Politics in Europe and Elsewhere: Much We Study, Little We Know?', *West European Politics* 31(6): 1103–28.
- Bourdieu, P. (1998) *Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992) *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Burrage, M. and Thorstendahl, R. (ed.) (1990) *Professions in Theory and History. Rethinking the Study of the Professions*, London: Sage.
- Büttner, S. M. (2012) *Mobilizing Regions, Mobilizing Europe. Expert knowledge and Scientific Planning in European Regional Development*, New York: Routledge.
- Coen, D. and Richardson, J. J. (ed.) (2009) *Lobbying the European Union. Institutions, actors, and issues*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, A. (2011) 'Bourdieu Hits Brussels: The Genesis and Structure of the European Field of Power', *International Political Sociology* 5(3): 335–39.
- Deutsch, K. W. (1961) 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', *The American Political Science Review* 55(3): 493–514.
- Eising, R. (2008) 'Interest groups in EU policy-making', *Living Revue European Governance* 3(4): 4-21.
- Eising, R. and Kohler-Koch, B. (ed.) (1999) *The Transformation of Governance in the European Union*, London: Routledge.
- Eriksen, E. O. (2009) *The Unfinished Democratization of Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Etzioni, A. (2013) 'The EU: The Communitarian Deficit', *European Societies* 15 (3): 312–30.
- Evetts, J. (2008): 'Introduction: Professional Work in Europe', *European Societies* 10 (4): 525-544.
- Evetts, J. (2013) 'Professionalism: Value and ideology', *Current Sociology* 61(5-6): 778–96.
- Falkner, G. (2000) 'Policy networks in a multi-level system: Convergence towards moderate diversity?', *West European Politics* 23(4): 94–120.
- Fligstein, N. (2001) 'Social Skill and the Theory of Fields', *Sociological Theory* 19(2): 105–25.
- Fligstein, N. (2008) *Euroclash. The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fligstein, N. and McAdam, D. (2011) 'Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action Fields', *Sociological Theory* 29(1): 1–26.
- Freidson, E. (2001) *Professionalism. The third logic*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Georgakakis, D. (2002) *Les métiers de l'Europe politique. Acteurs et professionnalisations de la construction européenne*, Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg
- Georgakakis, D. (2007) 'Who are the Directorate-General? European Construction and Administrative Careers in the Commission', EU-Consent Working Paper 17, University of Strasbourg.
- Georgakakis, D. (2009) 'Bringing Elite Sociology back in European Integration Theories. A Case Study Based on Commissioners and Directors General', paper prepared for the European Union Studies Association, Los Angeles, April 23-27.
- Georgakakis, D. (2011) 'Don't Throw out the "Brussels Bubble" with the Bathwater: From EU Institutions to the Field of Eurocracy', *International Political Sociology* 5(3): 331-34.
- Georgakakis, D. and Rowell, J. (ed.) (2013) *The Field of Eurocracy. Mapping EU Actors and Professionals*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Georgakakis, D. and Weisbein, J. (2010) 'From Above and Below. A Political Sociology of European Actors', *Comparative European Politics* 8(1): 93-109.
- Gornitzka, Å. and Sverdrup, U. (2008) 'Who Consults? The Configuration of Expert Groups in the European Union', *West European Union* 31(4): 725-50.
- Graziano, P. R. (2010) Europeanization and Consumer Interests. A Framework for Analysis (with evidence from the Italian Case), paper presented at the 40th Annual UACES Conference, Bruges, September 6-8.
- Greenwood, J. (2011) *Interest Representation in the European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Groenleer, M. (2009) *The Autonomy of European Union Agencies. A Comparative Study of Institutional Development*, Delft: Eburon.
- Guéguen, D. (2007) *European Lobbying*, Brussels: Europolitics.
- Guéguen, D. (2013) *Comitology: Hijacking European Power?* Brussels: Europolitics.
- Haas, E. B. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe. Political, social, and economic forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- Haas, P. M. (1992) 'Introduction: Epistemic communities and International Policy Coordination', *International Organization* 46(1): 1-35.
- Haller, M. (2008) *European Integration as an Elite Process. The Failure of a Dream?*, London: Routledge.
- Heidenreich, M. and Zeitlin, J. (ed.) (2009): *Changing European Employment and Welfare Regimes. The Influence of the Open Method of Coordination on National Reforms*, London: Routledge
- Hix, S. (1999) *The Political System of the European Union*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Hofmann, H. C. H. (2008) 'Mapping the European Administrative Space', *West European Politics* 31(4): 662-676.
- Hooghe, L. (2001) *The European Commission and the integration of Europe. Images of governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huster, S. (2008) *Europapolitik aus dem Ausschuss. Innenansichten des Ausschusswesens der EU*, Wiesbaden: VS Research.
- Kauppi, N. (2005) *Democracy, social resources and political power in the European Union*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Kauppi, N. (2011) 'EU Politics', in A. Favell und V. Guiraudon (eds.), *Sociology of the European Union*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 150–71.
- Klüver, H. (2013) *Lobbying in the European Union. Interest groups, lobbying coalitions, and policy change*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Klüver, H. and Saurugger, S. (2013) 'Opening the black box: The professionalization of interest groups in the European Union', *Interest Groups & Advocacy* 2(2): 185–205.
- Knill, C. (2001) *The Europeanisation of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lahusen, C. (2002) 'Commercial consultancies in the European Union: the shape and structure of professional interest intermediation', *Journal of European Public Policy* 9(5): 695–714.
- Lahusen, C. (2013) 'Law and Lawyers in the Brussels' World of Commercial Consultants', in A. Vauchez und B. de Witte (eds.), *Lawyering Europe. European Law as a Transnational Social Field*, Oxford: Hart Publishing Limited, pp. 177–96.
- Lahusen, C. and Jauss, C. (2001) *Lobbying als Beruf. Interessengruppen in der Europäischen Union*, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- De Lassalle, M. (2010) 'The emergence of 'European' careers in subnational French administrations', in J. Rowell und M. Mangenot (eds.), *A political sociology of the European Union. Reassessing constructivism*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 88–106.
- Levi-Faur, D. (2011) 'Regulatory Networks and Regulatory Agencification. Towards A Single European Administrative Space', *Journal of European Public Policy* 18(6): 810-29.
- Mahoney, C. (2008) *Brussels versus the Beltway. Advocacy in the United States and the European Union*, Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press .
- Majone, G. (1996) *Regulating Europe*, London: Routledge.

- Majone, G. (2005) *Dilemmas of European integration. The ambiguities and pitfalls of integration by stealth*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McDonald, M. (2012) 'Putting Culture in its Place. Anthropological reflections on the European Commission', *European Societies* 14(4): 540–61.
- Mérand, F. (2008) *European Defence Policy. Beyond the Nation State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Meyer, J. W. and Jepperson, R. L. (2000) 'The "Actors" of Modern Society: The Cultural Construction of Social Agency', *Sociological Theory* 18(1): 100–120.
- Michel, H. (2006) *Lobbyistes et lobbying de l'Union européenne*, Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg.
- Münch, R. (2010) *European Governmentality. The liberal drift of multilevel governance*, London: Routledge.
- Page, E. C. (1997) *People who run Europe*, Oxford: Clarendon.
- Pavalko, R. M. (1988) *Sociology of Occupations and Professions*, Itasca: Peacock Publishers.
- Pierson, R. (1994) 'The Epistemic Authority of Expertise', *PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 1: 398-405.
- Poehls, K. (2009) *Europa backstage. Expertenwissen, Habitus und kulturelle Codes im Machtfeld der EU*, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.
- Pollack, M. A. (2003) *The Engines of European Integration. Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Radaelli, C. M. (1999) *Technocracy in the European Union*, London: Longman.
- Rittberger, B. and Wonka, A. (2011) 'Introduction. Agency Governance in the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 18(6): 780-89.
- Rittberger, B. and Wonka, A. (2011a) 'Perspectives on EU Governance. An Empirical Assessment of the Political Attitudes of EU Agency Professionals', *Journal of European Public Policy* (18)6: 888-908.
- Ross, G. (1994) *Jaques Delors and European integration*, Oxford: Polity Press.
- Rowell, J. and Mangenot, M. (ed.) (2010) *A Political Sociology of the European Union*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Sabatier, P. A. (1998) 'The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy* 5(1): 98–130.
- Van Schendelen, R. (2013) *The Art of Lobbying the EU. More Machiavelli in Brussels*, revised edition, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Schnabel, V. (1998): 'La "mafia de Bruges": mythes et réalités du networking européen', *Politix* 11(43): 33-52.
- Scott, W. R. (2008) 'Lords of the Dance: Professionals as Institutional Agents', *Organization Studies* 29(2): 219–38.
- Shore, C. (2000) *Building Europe. The cultural politics of European integration*, London: Routledge.

- Stevens, A. and Stevens, H. (2001) *Brussels Bureaucrats? The Administration of the European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Thatcher, M. (2011) 'The Creation of European Regulatory Agencies and its Limits. A Comparative Analysis of European Delegation', *Journal of European Public Policy* 18(6): 790-809.
- Trondal, J. and Peters, G. B. (2013) 'The rise of European Administrative Space. Lessons Learned', *Journal of European Public Policy* 20 (2): 295-307.
- Vauchez, A. (2008) 'The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in the Government of the European Union', *International Political Sociology* 2(2): 128-44.
- Vauchez, A. and Witte, B. de (ed.) (2013) *Lawyering Europe. European Law as a Transnational Social Field*, Oxford: Hart Publishing Limited.
- Wallace, H., Pollack, M. and Young, A. R. (2010) *Policy-making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wonka, A., Baumgartner, F. R., Mahoney, C. and Berkhout, J. (2010) 'Measuring the size and scope of the EU interest group population', *European Union Politics* 11(3): 463-76.