D. Demougin and C. Helm, "Overwhelmed by routine tasks: A multitasking principal agent perspective" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 216.
@Article{Demougin2023,
author = {Demougin, Dominique and Helm, Carsten},
journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
title = {Overwhelmed by routine tasks: A multitasking principal agent perspective},
year = {2023},
pages = {654--669},
volume = {216},
publisher = {Elsevier},
}
Helm and Wirl, "Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation" Journal of Economics 132.1: 41-65..
@article{helm_multitasking_2021, title = {Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation},
url = {https://link.springer.com/epdf/10.1007/s00712-020-00713-9?sharing_token=hsiAoRvipABymYl7keJW4fe4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY4ZLKhI-K-dfCaJp9cl6gn12ZVMnTzFutB-mhqIwZZx4fhZn6wmiK8yAR7yNqEwJ8aixK26UrVPU8q7PoIRtlfo2eTBzwvYYTXxixRa-LQH63X5YbVJO_bk_hBLkFTc8K4=},
journal = {Journal of Economics 132.1: 41-65.},
author = {{Helm} and {Wirl}},
year = {2021},
}
C. Helm and M. Mier, "Steering the Energy Transition in a World of Intermittent Electricity Supply: Optimal Subsidiesand Taxes for Renewables and Storage" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
@article{helm_steering_2021, title = {Steering the {Energy} {Transition} in a {World} of {Intermittent} {Electricity} {Supply}: {Optimal} {Subsidiesand} {Taxes} for {Renewables} and {Storage}},
issn = {0095-0696},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069621000711},
abstract = {Spurred by substantial subsidies, renewable energies have reduced their costs and captured a steadily growing market share. However, the variability of solar and wind power leads to new challenges for power systems. Policy instruments for steering the energy transition towards a zero-carbon future must account for this. We consider an economy in which competitive firms use pollutive fossils, intermittent renewables, and storage for electricity production. A Pigouvian tax is still efficient, because price fluctuations that result from intermittent renewables provide sufficient incentives to invest in storage capacities. However, governments have proved reluctant to impose carbon taxes. Therefore, we examine second-best subsidies when carbon pricing is imperfect. The optimal subsidy rate for renewables decreases as electricity production becomes less reliant on fossils. The optimal storage subsidy is usually negative as long as fossils are dispatched while filling the storage, but turns positive thereafter. This is because more storage capacity reduces the price when stored electricity is supplied to the market, but raises it when storage adds to demand. This has countervailing effects on firms’ incentives to invest in fossil capacities. A numerical simulation illustrates that substantial subsidy payments are required even after fossils have been completely driven out of the market.},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
author = {Helm, Carsten and Mier, Mathias},
year = {2021},
}
Carsten Helm and Mathias Mier, "On the efficient market diffusion of intermittent renewable energies" Energy Economics.
doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.01.017
@article{carsten_helm_efficient_2019, title = {On the efficient market diffusion of intermittent renewable energies},
issn = {0140-9883},
doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2019.01.017},
abstract = {Capacity costs of renewable energies have been decreasing dramatically and are expected to fall further, making them more competitive with fossils. Building on an analytically tractable peak-load pricing model, we analyze how intermittency of renewable energies aects the market diusion that results from these lower costs. In particular, once renewables have become competitive by attaining the same levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) as fossils, the marginal increase in ecient capacities due to a further cost reduction varies substantially. Initially it is small, then it rises, but it falls again once renewable capacities are large enough to satisfy the whole electricity demand at times of high availability. If external costs of fossils are internalized by a Pigouvian tax, then perfect competition leads to ecient investments in renewable and fossil capacities; even though we assume that only a subgroup of consumers can adapt their demand to price uctuations that are caused by the intermittency of renewables. Moreover, fossils receive a capacity payment through the market for their reliability in serving demand of non-reactive consumers. Maximum electricity prices rise with the share of renewables. If regulators impose a price cap, this initially raises investments in renewables, but the eect may reverse if the share of renewables is large.},
journal = {Energy Economics},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Mathias Mier}},
year = {2019},
keywords = {energy transition, intermittent energy sources, peak-load pricing, price caps, renewable energies, technology diffusion},
}
Moritz A. Drupp, Jasper N. Meya, Stefan Baumgärtner, and Martin F. Quaas, "Economic inequality and the value of nature" Ecological Economics, vol. 150.
doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.029
@article{moritz_a_drupp_economic_2018, title = {Economic inequality and the value of nature},
volume = {150},
doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.029},
abstract = {Understanding what influences the value of nature is crucial for informing environmental policy. From a sustainability perspective, economic valuation should not only seek to determine willingness to pay for environmental goods to devise an efficient allocation of scarce resources, but should also account for distributional effects to ensure justice. Yet, how economic inequality affects the value of non-market environmental goods remains understudied. Combining recently developed theoretical results with empirical evidence we show that more equal societies have a higher valuation for environmental public goods and that non-market benefits of environmental policy accrue over-proportionally to poorer households. On this ground, we identify a number of fruitful areas for future research and discuss implications for environmental valuation, management and policy-making. We conclude that environmental valuation should explicitly account for economic inequality, and that encompassing assessments of the distributional effects of environmental policies must consider the distribution of non-market environmental benefits.},
journal = {Ecological Economics},
author = {{Moritz A. Drupp} and {Jasper N. Meya} and {Stefan Baumgärtner} and {Martin F. Quaas}},
year = {2018},
keywords = {330, distribution, Environmental goods, H43, income inequality, nature conservation, Q01, Q51, Q56, Q57, valuation, Willingness to pay},
pages = {340--345},
}
J. N. Meya and K. Eisenack, "Effectiveness of gaming for communicating and teaching climate change" Climatic Change, vol. 149, iss. 3.
doi: 10.1007/s10584-018-2254-7
@article{meya_effectiveness_2018, title = {Effectiveness of gaming for communicating and teaching climate change},
volume = {149},
issn = {1573-1480},
doi = {10.1007/s10584-018-2254-7},
abstract = {Games are increasingly proposed as an innovative way to convey scientific insights on the climate-economic system to students, non-experts, and the wider public. Yet, it is not clear if games can meet such expectations. We present quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of a simulation game for communicating and teaching international climate politics. We use a sample of over 200 students from Germany playing the simulation game KEEP COOL. We combine pre- and postgame surveys on climate politics with data on individual in-game decisions. Our key findings are that gaming increases the sense of personal responsibility, the confidence in politics for climate change mitigation, and makes more optimistic about international cooperation in climate politics. Furthermore, players that do cooperate less in the game become more optimistic about international cooperation but less confident about politics. These results are relevant for the design of future games, showing that effective climate games do not require climate-friendly in-game behavior as a winning condition. We conclude that simulation games can facilitate experiential learning about the difficulties of international climate politics and thereby complement both conventional communication and teaching methods.},
number = {3},
journal = {Climatic Change},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Eisenack, Klaus},
year = {2018},
pages = {319--333},
}
J. N. Meya, U. Kornek, and K. Lessmann, "How empirical uncertainties influence the stability of climate coalitions" International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 18, iss. 2.
doi: 10.1007/s10784-017-9378-5
@article{meya_how_2018, title = {How empirical uncertainties influence the stability of climate coalitions},
volume = {18},
issn = {1573-1553},
doi = {10.1007/s10784-017-9378-5},
abstract = {International climate agreements are negotiated in the face of uncertainties concerning the costs and benefits of abatement and in the presence of incentives for free-riding. Numerical climate coalition models provide estimates of the challenges affecting cooperation, but often resort to assuming certainty with respect to the values of model parameters. We study the impact of uncertainty on the stability of coalitions in the Model of International Climate Agreements using the technique of Monte Carlo analysis. We extend the existing literature by (1) calibrating parametric uncertainty about damages and abatement costs to estimates from meta-studies and by (2) explicitly considering uncertainty in the curvature of the damage function. We find that stability is more sensitive to uncertainty in damages than in abatement costs and most sensitive to uncertainty about the regional distribution of damages. Our calculations suggest that heterogeneity can increase stability of coalitions; however, this depends on the availability of transfers.},
number = {2},
journal = {International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Kornek, Ulrike and Lessmann, Kai},
year = {2018},
pages = {175--198},
}
J. N. Meya and L. Bethlehem, "Global spielen, lokal handeln? Simulation der Rolle von Städten im Klimawandel mit dem digitalen Planspiel KEEP COOL mobil" Die Niedersächsische Gemeinde, iss. 2.
@article{meya_global_2017, title = {Global spielen, lokal handeln? {Simulation} der {Rolle} von {Städten} im {Klimawandel} mit dem digitalen {Planspiel} {KEEP} {COOL} mobil},
url = {http://www.climate-game.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/MeyaBethlehem_2017_Global-spielen-lokal-handeln_DNG.pdf},
number = {2},
journal = {Die Niedersächsische Gemeinde},
author = {Meya, J. N. and Bethlehem, L.},
year = {2017},
pages = {9--10},
}
Nils Droste and Jasper N. Meya, "Ecosystem services in infrastructure planning a case study of the projected deepening of the Lower Weser river in Germany" Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, vol. 60, iss. 2.
doi: 10.1080/09640568.2016.1151405
@article{nils_droste_ecosystem_2017, title = {Ecosystem services in infrastructure planning a case study of the projected deepening of the {Lower} {Weser} river in {Germany}},
volume = {60},
doi = {10.1080/09640568.2016.1151405},
abstract = {We consider how ecosystem services can be incorporated into water infrastructure planning by studying the projected deepening of the Lower Weser river channel in Germany. We recalculate the project's benefitcost ratio by integrating the monetary value of changes in different ecosystem services, as follows: (1) the restoration costs of a mitigation measure for a loss in fresh water supply for agricultural production in the estuary region, (2) the costs of a loss in habitat services, transferring the willingness to pay from a contingent valuation study to the area assessed in the environmental impact assessment, and (3) the benefits of emissions savings induced by more efficient shipping, taking a marginal abatement cost approach. We find that including monetary values for ecosystem service changes leads to a substantial drop in the benefitcost ratio. On this basis, we argue for a reform of the standard costbenefit analysis to facilitate more complete welfare assessments.},
number = {2},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Planning and Management},
author = {{Nils Droste} and {Jasper N. Meya}},
year = {2017},
pages = {231--248},
}
Stefan Baumgärtner, Moritz A. Drupp, Jasper N. Meya, Jan M. Munz, and Martin F. Quaas, "Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 85.
doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.005
@article{stefan_baumgartner_income_2017, title = {Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods},
volume = {85},
issn = {0095-0696},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069617302450},
doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.005},
abstract = {We study how the distribution of income among members of society, and income inequality in particular, affects social willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental public goods. We find that social WTP for environmental goods decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only if environmental goods and manufactured goods are substitutes (complements). We derive adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in income distributions between a study site and a policy site. For illustration, we quantify how social WTP for environmental public goods depends on the respective income distributions for empirical case studies in Sweden and the World at large. We find that the adjustment for income inequality can be substantial.},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
author = {{Stefan Baumgärtner} and {Moritz A. Drupp} and {Jasper N. Meya} and {Jan M. Munz} and {Martin F. Quaas}},
year = {2017},
keywords = {Benefit transfer, Environmental goods, Income distribution, Inequality, Public goods, Sustainability policy, Willingness to pay},
pages = {35--61},
}
A. Lillie and J. N. Meya, "Beitrag der politischen Bildung zur Bildung für nachhaltige Entwicklung" polis, iss. 1.
@article{lillie_beitrag_2016, title = {Beitrag der politischen {Bildung} zur {Bildung} für nachhaltige {Entwicklung}},
number = {1},
journal = {polis},
author = {Lillie, Anna-Lena and Meya, Jasper N.},
year = {2016},
pages = {11--14},
}
J. N. Meya and L. Meya, "Das Klima aufs Spiel setzen. Simulation der internationalen Klimaverhandlungen mit dem Planspiel KEEP COOL" GWP - Gesellschaft-Wirtschaft-Politik, iss. 2.
doi: 10.3224/gwp.v65i2.24022
@article{meya_klima_2016, title = {Das {Klima} aufs {Spiel} setzen. {Simulation} der internationalen {Klimaverhandlungen} mit dem {Planspiel} {KEEP} {COOL}},
doi = {10.3224/gwp.v65i2.24022},
number = {2},
journal = {GWP - Gesellschaft-Wirtschaft-Politik},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Meya, Lukas},
year = {2016},
pages = {249--259},
}
J. N. Meya, N. Droste, and B. Klauer, "Methodische Defizite der Umweltbewertung im Bundesverkehrswegeplan 2030" WasserWirtschaft, iss. 10.
@article{meya_methodische_2016, title = {Methodische {Defizite} der {Umweltbewertung} im {Bundesverkehrswegeplan} 2030},
url = {https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jasper_Meya/publication/309284167_Methodische_Defizite_der_Umweltbewertung_im_Bundesverkehrswegeplan_2030/links/595ba3b50f7e9bf415b49573/Methodische-Defizite-der-Umweltbewertung-im-Bundesverkehrswegeplan-2030.pdf},
number = {10},
journal = {WasserWirtschaft},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Droste, Nils and Klauer, Bernd},
year = {2016},
pages = {57--58},
}
J. N. Meya, P. Neetzow, L. Neubauer, and A. Pechan, "Die Menge machts? Das EEG 2017 und die Folgen für die deutsche Energiewende" ET - Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, vol. 66, iss. 11.
@article{meya_menge_2016, title = {Die {Menge} machts? {Das} {EEG} 2017 und die {Folgen} für die deutsche {Energiewende}},
volume = {66},
url = {http://dezentral2015.apps-1and1.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Meya_et_al_2016.pdf},
number = {11},
journal = {ET - Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Neetzow, Paul and Neubauer, Linda and Pechan, Anna},
year = {2016},
pages = {34--37},
}
Carsten Helm and Franz Wirl, "Climate Policies with Private Information: The Case for Unilateral Action" Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3, iss. 4.
doi: 10.1086/688583
@article{carsten_helm_climate_2016, title = {Climate {Policies} with {Private} {Information}: {The} {Case} for {Unilateral} {Action}},
volume = {3},
doi = {10.1086/688583},
abstract = {AbstractCountries often have private information about their willingness to pay for protecting the climate system. We use a principal-agent model to reexamine the economic case for unilateral action by individual countries, in our case of the principal. We find that the incentive structure that arises in an incomplete information framework may lead to a more positive assessment of unilateral action than in papers that neglect private information. First, we find that a unilateral commitment to emission reductions that is made before contract negotiations always reduces aggregate emissions, in contrast to the results in the seminal contribution by Hoel. Second, we show that the principal often has an interest to unilaterally reduce emissions below the level to which she would be obliged under the standard contract solution. Hence we provide an economic rationale for overcompliance. Multilateral externalities and type-dependent outside options, which are characteristic for climate policies, play a crucial role to explain these results.},
number = {4},
journal = {Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Franz Wirl}},
year = {2016},
pages = {893--916},
}
Carsten Helm and Franz Wirl, "Multilateral externalities: Contracts with private information either about costs or benefits" Economics Letters, vol. 141.
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.020
@article{carsten_helm_multilateral_2016, title = {Multilateral externalities: {Contracts} with private information either about costs or benefits},
volume = {141},
issn = {0165-1765},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516300040},
doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.020},
abstract = {Abstract This note uses the framework of Martimort and Sand-Zantmann (2013, forthcoming) about international environmental agreements. The objective is to demonstrate how a shift of private information from cost to benefit affects contracts and permit market outcomes although this seemingly ad hoc choice has no effect outside contracts and absent market interventions.},
journal = {Economics Letters},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Franz Wirl}},
year = {2016},
keywords = {Business as usual, Contracts, Difference due to allocation of private information, Out-of-contract, Permit market, Principalagent},
pages = {27--31},
}
Marius Paschen, "Dynamic analysis of the German day-ahead electricity spot market" Energy Economics, vol. 59.
doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2016.07.019
@article{marius_paschen_dynamic_2016, title = {Dynamic analysis of the {German} day-ahead electricity spot market},
volume = {59},
issn = {0140-9883},
url = {//www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988316301918},
doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2016.07.019},
abstract = {Abstract This paper analyzes the dynamic behavior of day-ahead spot prices in the German electricity spot market due to positive structural shocks in wind and solar power. It uses a dynamic structural vector autoregressive model to estimate the related structural impulse response functions. The estimates suggest that wind power shocks have a more prolonged negative effect on spot prices than solar power shocks. Significant autocorrelations of wind power for larger lags indicate these results. The total negative merit order effect of a solar power shock is larger when using a reasonable model specification. One reason might be that solar power shocks coincide with demand peaks. However, results regarding the relation of the effects of wind and solar should be dealt with carefully because these results do not hold for all specifications. Past static estimates show differences in the total average negative merit order effects. These estimates might be overstated if wind and solar power dynamics are transferred to the merit order effects.},
journal = {Energy Economics},
author = {{Marius Paschen}},
year = {2016},
keywords = {Electricity market, solar power dynamics, Spot prices, Structural impulse response functions, Structural vector autoregressive model, Wind},
pages = {118--128},
}
L. Meya and J. N. Meya, "Schuldenstreit. Ein Konferenzspiel zur Griechenlandkrise" polis, iss. 3.
@article{meya_schuldenstreit_2015, title = {Schuldenstreit. {Ein} {Konferenzspiel} zur {Griechenlandkrise}},
number = {3},
journal = {polis},
author = {Meya, L. and Meya, J. N.},
year = {2015},
pages = {20--24},
}
Carsten Helm and Stefan Pichler, "Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading" Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 60.
@article{carsten_helm_climate_2015-1, title = {Climate {Policy} with {Technology} {Transfers} and {Permit} {Trading}},
volume = {60},
url = {http://rdcu.be/mFGb},
abstract = {In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the South, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is beneficial for the North as long as it is a permit buyer; hence it chooses to subsidize TT. By contrast, the permit selling South suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates, despite receiving subsidies. We also consider how TT affects countries' non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and nd that it tends to reduce overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates some results and explores some further comparative statics.},
journal = {Environmental and Resource Economics},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Stefan Pichler}},
year = {2015},
keywords = {emissions trading, international climate policy, technology transfer},
pages = {37--54},
}
Carsten Helm and Robert C. Schmidt, "Climate cooperation with technology investments and border carbon adjustment" European Economic Review, vol. 75.
doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.01.007
@article{carsten_helm_climate_2015, title = {Climate cooperation with technology investments and border carbon adjustment},
volume = {75},
issn = {0014-2921},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292115000082},
doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.01.007},
abstract = {Abstract A central question in climate policy is whether early investments in low-carbon technologies are a useful first step towards a more effective climate agreement in the future. We introduce a climate cooperation model with endogenous R\&D investments where countries protect their international competitiveness via border carbon adjustments (BCA). 5BCA6 raises the scope for cooperation and leads to a non-trivial relation between countries? prior R\&D investments and participation in the coalition. We find that early investments in R\&D render free-riding more attractive. Therefore, with delayed cooperation on emission abatement and ex-ante R\&D investments, the outcome is often characterized by high participation but inefficiently low technology investments and abatement.},
journal = {European Economic Review},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Robert C. Schmidt}},
year = {2015},
keywords = {Border carbon adjustment, Border tax adjustment, Climate treaty, Coalitions, R\&D},
pages = {112--130},
}
Carsten Helm and Franz Wirl, "The principalagent model with multilateral externalities: An application to climate agreements" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 67, iss. 2.
doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2013.11.006
@article{carsten_helm_principalagent_2014, title = {The principalagent model with multilateral externalities: {An} application to climate agreements},
volume = {67},
issn = {0095-0696},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069613001241},
doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2013.11.006},
abstract = {Abstract We consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present. The motivating example is that of an international climate agreement given private information about the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for emissions abatement. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent and to assure his participation. Optimal contracts equalize marginal abatement costs and, thus, can be implemented by a system of competitive permit trading. Moreover, optimal contracts can include a boundary part (i.e., the endogenous, type dependent participation constraint is binding), which is not a copy of the outside option of no contract. Compared to this outside option, a contract can increase emissions of the principal for types with a low WTP, and reduce her payoff for high types. Subsidies can be constant or even decreasing in emission reductions, and turn negative so that the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal.},
number = {2},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Franz Wirl}},
year = {2014},
keywords = {Environmental agreements, Mechanism design, Multilateral externalities, Private information, Type-dependent outside options},
pages = {141--154},
}
Carsten Helm and Michael Neugart, "Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information" Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), vol. 169, iss. 3.
@article{carsten_helm_coalition_2013, title = {Coalition {Governments} and {Policy} {Reform} with {Asymmetric} {Information}},
volume = {169},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/jinste/urnsici0932-4569(201309)1693_383cgaprw_2.0.tx_2-u.html},
abstract = {With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by government members with heterogeneous policy preferences, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. This provides a rationale why coalition governments may find it easier to implement reforms than single-party governments, why oversized coalitions are formed, and why governments sometimes have cabinet members from opposing parties.},
number = {3},
journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Michael Neugart}},
year = {2013},
pages = {383--406},
}
D. Demougin and C. Helm, "Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard" European Economic Review, vol. 55, iss. 7.
@article{demougin_job_2011, title = {Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard},
volume = {55},
issn = {0014-2921},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v55y2011i7p964-979.html},
abstract = {We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers' outside option. The latter is improved for low-skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high-skilled workers. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches, which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.},
number = {7},
journal = {European Economic Review},
author = {Demougin, Dominique and Helm, Carsten},
year = {2011},
keywords = {Incentive contracts, Job matching, Moral hazard, Nash bargaining, Unemployment benefits},
pages = {964--979},
}
J. C. Carbone, C. Helm, and T. F. Rutherford, "The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 58, iss. 3.
@article{carbone_case_2009, title = {The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy},
volume = {58},
issn = {0095-0696},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeeman/v58y2009i3p266-280.html},
abstract = {We evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design of national abatement policies. Countries' decisions about their participation in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made non-cooperatively; so a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement agreements or that participation will result in significant environmental gains. Despite this, we find that emission trade agreements can be effective; that smaller groupings pairing developing and developed-world partners often perform better than agreements with larger rosters; and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these outcomes.},
number = {3},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
author = {Carbone, Jared C. and Helm, Carsten and Rutherford, Thomas F.},
year = {2009},
keywords = {Global warming Coalitions General equilibrium Tradable permits},
pages = {266--280},
}
Carsten Helm and Anja Schöttner, "Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R\&D Spillovers" German Economic Review, vol. 9.
@article{carsten_helm_subsidizing_2008, title = {Subsidizing {Technological} {Innovations} in the {Presence} of {R}\&{D} {Spillovers}},
volume = {9},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/germec/v9y2008ip339-353.html},
abstract = {We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms to produce an output, for example electricity from renewable energy sources. Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production cost of the output. Part of these investments spills over and also reduces production cost of the other firm. Comparing a general price subsidy and an innovation tournament, we find that the principal's expected cost of implementing a given expected output is always higher under the tournament, even though this scheme may lead to more innovation. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008.},
journal = {German Economic Review},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Anja Schöttner}},
year = {2008},
pages = {339--353},
}
C. Böhringer and C. Helm, "On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost" Resource and Energy Economics, vol. 30, iss. 2.
@article{bohringer_fair_2008, title = {On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost},
volume = {30},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/resene/v30y2008i2p260-276.html},
abstract = {This paper introduces a solution for the fair division of emission reduction costs in the climate change regime. Our primary focus is on the fair division of efficiency gains that arise from exchanging the initial allocation of emission entitlements, rather than the initial allocation itself. We propose to complement the competitive Walrasian solution with welfare bounds, the ethical justification of which rests on commonality of ownership. Simulations with an intertemporal computable general equilibrium model illustrate the relevance of such welfare bounds. For a wide range of initial allocations of emission entitlements - including an equal per capita allocation - we find that developing countries should be fully compensated for their emission abatement efforts, but should not receive any further transfers.},
number = {2},
journal = {Resource and Energy Economics},
author = {Böhringer, Christoph and Helm, Carsten},
year = {2008},
pages = {260--276},
}
C. Helm, "Fair division theory and climate change policy" Environment and Development Economics, vol. 13, iss. 04.
@article{helm_fair_2008, title = {Fair division theory and climate change policy},
volume = {13},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/endeec/v13y2008i04p441-455_00.html},
abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.},
number = {04},
journal = {Environment and Development Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten},
year = {2008},
pages = {441--455},
}
C. Helm, "How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods" International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 28, iss. 4.
@article{helm_how_2008, title = {How liable should an exporter be?: {The} case of trade in hazardous goods},
volume = {28},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v28y2008i4p263-271.html},
abstract = {This paper analyzes liability issues in the context of internationally traded goods like hazardous waste. It focuses on waste disposers of a small open economy that are judgement-proof due to either wealth constraints or regulatory liability limits. In this case, the extension of liability to waste exporters distorts the factor allocation and may reduce disposal care. Hence the optimal extension is partial at most. However, extending liability increases incentives of the waste importing country to hold domestic disposers liable. Interaction through the price system and through contracts that condition payments for disposal services on the occurrence of an accident yield identical outcomes if disposers are judgement-proof.},
number = {4},
journal = {International Review of Law and Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten},
year = {2008},
keywords = {Extended liability Hazardous waste trade Externalities Moral hazard},
pages = {263--271},
}
Dominique Demougin and Carsten Helm, "Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power" German Economic Review, vol. 7.
@article{dominique_demougin_moral_2006, title = {Moral {Hazard} and {Bargaining} {Power}},
volume = {7},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/germec/v7y2006ip463-470.html},
abstract = {We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent's outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent's bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006.},
journal = {German Economic Review},
author = {{Dominique Demougin} and {Carsten Helm}},
year = {2006},
pages = {463--470},
}
Dominique Demougin, Claude Fluet, and Carsten Helm, "Output and wages with inequality averse agents" Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 39, iss. 2.
@article{dominique_demougin_output_2006, title = {Output and wages with inequality averse agents},
volume = {39},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v39y2006i2p399-413.html},
abstract = {We analyse a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract that, owing to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other agent resents. We show that greater inequality aversion unambiguously decreases total output and therefore average labour productivity. More specifically, inequality aversion reduces effort, wage, and payoff of agent 1. Effects on wage and effort of agent 2 depend on whether effort levels across tasks are substitutes or complements in the firm's output function.},
number = {2},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics},
author = {{Dominique Demougin} and {Claude Fluet} and {Carsten Helm}},
year = {2006},
pages = {399--413},
}
C. Helm, "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices" Journal of Public Economics, vol. 87, iss. 12.
@article{helm_international_2003, title = {International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices},
volume = {87},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v87y2003i12p2737-2747.html},
abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.},
number = {12},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten},
year = {2003},
pages = {2737--2747},
}
Carsten Helm and Udo E. Simonis, "Distributive Justice in International Environmental Policy: Axiomatic Foundation and Exemplary Formulation" Environmental Values, vol. 10, iss. 1.
@article{carsten_helm_distributive_2001, title = {Distributive {Justice} in {International} {Environmental} {Policy}: {Axiomatic} {Foundation} and {Exemplary} {Formulation}},
volume = {10},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/env/journl/ev10ev1001.html},
abstract = {Proceeding on a limited number of general, widely accepted equity criteria, we develop a proposal for distributing common resources. In particular, the proposed fair division mechanism is individually rational, envy-free, Pareto-efficient and satisfies the stand alone test, which follows as a minimum requirement from the resource and population monotonicity criteria. Applied to international climate policy, the thrust of this proposal is that the South should initially be fully compensated for the greenhouse gas abatement measures it is to undertake as a result of efficiency considerations.},
number = {1},
journal = {Environmental Values},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Udo E. Simonis}},
year = {2001},
keywords = {climate change, common resources, equity, fair division},
pages = {5--18},
}
Carsten Helm, "On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities" International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 30, iss. 1.
@article{carsten_helm_existence_2001, title = {On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities},
volume = {30},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v30y2001i1p141-146.html},
abstract = {This paper analyzes a game in coalitional form that is derived from a simple economy with multilateral externalities. Following Chander and Tulkens (1997) we assume that agents react to a blocking coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. A non-empty core of this game is established by showing that the game is balanced. The proof relies only on standard convexity assumptions and, therefore, substantially generalizes the results in Chander and Tulkens (1997).},
number = {1},
journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
author = {{Carsten Helm}},
year = {2001},
keywords = {coalitional games},
pages = {141--146},
}
Carsten Helm and Detlef Sprinz, "Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes" Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 44, iss. 5.
doi: 10.1177/0022002700044005004
@article{carsten_helm_measuring_2000, title = {Measuring the {Effectiveness} of {International} {Environmental} {Regimes}},
volume = {44},
doi = {10.1177/0022002700044005004},
abstract = {Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international governance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measurement concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the measurement concept is demonstrated by way of two international treaties regulating transboundary air pollution in Europe. The results demonstrate that the regimes indeed show positive effects–but fall substantially short of the collective optima.},
number = {5},
journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Detlef Sprinz}},
year = {2000},
pages = {630--652},
}
Carsten Helm, Thomas Bruckner, Gerhard Petschel-Held, Ferenc L. Toth, Hans Martin Füssel, Marian Leimbach, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, "Climate Change Decision-Support and the Tolerable Windows Approach" Environmental Modeling and Assessment, vol. 4, iss. 4.
@article{carsten_helm_climate_1999, title = {Climate {Change} {Decision}-{Support} and the {Tolerable} {Windows} {Approach}},
volume = {4},
url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33637/},
number = {4},
journal = {Environmental Modeling and Assessment},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Thomas Bruckner} and {Gerhard Petschel-Held} and {Ferenc L. Toth} and {Hans Martin Füssel} and {Marian Leimbach} and {Hans Joachim Schellnhuber}},
year = {1999},
pages = {217--234},
}
Carsten Helm, Thomas Bruckner, and Ferenc Toth, "Value judgments and the choice of climate protection strategies" International Journal of Social Economics, vol. 26, iss. 7/8/9.
@article{carsten_helm_value_1999, title = {Value judgments and the choice of climate protection strategies},
volume = {26},
url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33636/},
number = {7/8/9},
journal = {International Journal of Social Economics},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Thomas Bruckner} and {Ferenc Toth}},
year = {1999},
pages = {974--1021},
}
Detlef F. Sprinz and Carsten Helm, "The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement Concept" International Political Science Review? Revue internationale de science pol, vol. 20, iss. 4.
@article{detlef_f_sprinz_effect_1999, title = {The {Effect} of {Global} {Environmental} {Regimes}: {A} {Measurement} {Concept}},
volume = {20},
abstract = {The article outlines a method to measure the effect which international regimes have on solving global environmental problems such as global climate change. By using political-economic cost/benefit analysis, a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum (lower and upper bounds) are derived. By comparing the actual performance of a regime to these bounds, a simple coefficient of regime effectiveness can be computed. After theoretically deriving the various bounds, the authors discuss the determining factors and provide guidance on how such a research agenda could be pursued empirically. The authors conclude with suggestions to further refine the measurement concept and its merit for public policy.},
number = {4},
journal = {International Political Science Review? Revue internationale de science pol},
author = {{Detlef F. Sprinz} and {Carsten Helm}},
year = {1999},
pages = {359--369},
}
Carsten Helm, "International Cooperation Behind the Veil of Uncertainty – The Case of Transboundary Acidification" Environmental & Resource Economics, vol. 12, iss. 2.
@article{carsten_helm_international_1998, title = {International {Cooperation} {Behind} the {Veil} of {Uncertainty} – {The} {Case} of {Transboundary} {Acidification}},
volume = {12},
url = {http://rdcu.be/mLeb},
abstract = {The complexities of international environmental problems are only poorly understood. Hence, decision makers have to negotiate about abatement measures even though they do not know the 'true' model of the ecological system and have only a rough idea about the costs and benefits of their action. It will be analysed to what extent this kind of 'model uncertainty' – where players do not only have incomplete information about the payoff functions of the other players, but also about their own payoff function – affects the prospects of international cooperation. Using a simple game-theoretic model, it is shown how countries can use the veil of uncertainty to hide their distributional interests. The arguments are based on a deviation from the common prior assumption, which seems particularly questionable in a setting comprising various countries with different cultural and scientific backgrounds. Finally the model will prove useful to quantitatively and qualitatively illustrate the central role of model uncertainty in the negotiations of the first Sulphur Protocol signed to combat transboundary acidification. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998},
number = {2},
journal = {Environmental \& Resource Economics},
author = {{Carsten Helm}},
year = {1998},
keywords = {acid rain, international negotiations, model uncertainty, transboundary pollution},
pages = {185--201},
}
Carsten Helm, "Transboundary environmental problems and new trade rules" International Journal of Social Economics, vol. 23, iss. 8.
@article{carsten_helm_transboundary_1996, title = {Transboundary environmental problems and new trade rules},
volume = {23},
url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33639/},
abstract = {Increased environmental pollution and the globalization of economies have initiated an academic debate on the relationship between international trade and the environment. Addresses the question of whether the present GATT/WTO regime conflicts with effective policies to cope with transboundary environmental problems, including the protection of global commons. Analyses the welfare effects of transboundary pollution tariffs by using a simple partial equilibrium framework. Contrasts the results with an assessment of the existing GATT/WTO regime, in which no distinction between national and transboundary environmental problems has been made. Outlines, in conclusion, some basic elements of a necessary reform of the GATT/WTO regime. These proposals would allow border tax adjustment for certain types of production-related environmental charge without undermining an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system.},
number = {8},
journal = {International Journal of Social Economics},
author = {{Carsten Helm}},
year = {1996},
pages = {29--45},
}
C. Böhringer and C. Helm, "The Reverse Waterbed Effect of Sector Coupling—Unilateral Climate Policies and Multilateral Emissions Trading" , CESifo Working Paper 10362, 2023.
@techreport{bohringer2023reverse, title={The Reverse Waterbed Effect of Sector Coupling—Unilateral Climate Policies and Multilateral Emissions Trading},
author={B{\"o}hringer, Christoph and Helm, Carsten},
url = {https://www.cesifo.org/en/publications/2023/working-paper/reverse-waterbed-effect-sector-coupling-unilateral-climate-policies},
abstract = {It is widely acknowledged that the transition towards a zero-emissions economy requires electrification of energy-related processes across all sectors of the economy — so-called sector coupling. In our analysis we consider countries whose electricity sectors are regulated by a multilateral emissions trading system (ETS). We examine the implications of a unilateral CO2 tax by a group of countries on emissions in their transport and buildings sectors. The tax induces a switch to electricity-based technologies (e.g., electric vehicles and heat pumps), thus raising the demand for emission allowances and their price in the electricity sector. This induces emission reductions in the electricity sectors of the other countries covered under the ETS; hence we have a “reverse waterbed effect”. CO2-intensive electricity generation technologies, especially coal, are most affected by this and their output falls as a result of sector coupling. Subsidies for electricity-based technologies in the transport and buildings sectors have similar effects, and the main insights still hold if these sectors are governed by a separate ETS, as it is planned for the EU. We examine this in a stylized analytical model and use a computable general equilibrium model calibrated to data for the EU to quantify the effects. Moreover, for the case of a second ETS, our numerical results suggest that the unilateral cancellation of emission allowances in the power sector leads to substantially higher welfare losses than doing so in the transport and buildings sectors.},
number = {10362},
year={2023},
type={CESifo Working Paper}
}
C. Böhringer, C. Helm, and L. Schürer, "How to Boost Countries’ Climate Ambitions: Turning Gains from Emissions Trading into Gains for Climate" , CESifo Working Paper 10624, 2023.
@techreport{bohringer_how_2023, title = {How to {Boost} {Countries}’ {Climate} {Ambitions}: {Turning} {Gains} from {Emissions} {Trading} into {Gains} for {Climate}},
url = {https://www.cesifo.org/en/publications/2023/working-paper/how-boost-countries-climate-ambitions-turning-gains-emissions},
abstract = {The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement fall short of the abatement needed to reach the 2°C target. Emissions trading could be a “costless” means to reduce the ambition gap if countries used their gains from trade for additional abatement. However, this requires cooperative behavior. We show that with emissions trading, countries’ non-cooperative choices of emissions reduction contributions can lead to even more abatement, provided that these contributions may not be lower than initial NDCs. Intuitively, countries with high climate damages raise their contributions if they can meet them partly through abatement in countries with low abatement costs.},
number = {10624},
type = {CESifo Working Paper},
author = {Böhringer, Christoph and Helm, Carsten and Schürer, Laura},
year = {2023},
}
Dominique Demougin and Carsten Helm, "Overwhelmed by Routine Tasks: A Multi-Tasking Principal Agent Perspective" , CESifo Working Paper 9753, 2022.
@techreport{dominique_demougin_overwhelmed_2022, title = {Overwhelmed by {Routine} {Tasks}: {A} {Multi}-{Tasking} {Principal} {Agent} {Perspective}},
url = {https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2022/working-paper/overwhelmed-routine-tasks-multi-tasking-principle-agent},
abstract = {We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nashbargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both tasks. Compared to the efficient solution, more employees exert both tasks and effort in the routine task is inefficiently large. As work overload in the routine task is decoupled from a corresponding increase in remuneration, employees perceive a loss of control to allocate effort between the two tasks. Reductions in employees’ bargaining power and improvements in monitoring technologies aggravate the issue.},
number = {9753},
type = {CESifo Working Paper},
author = {{Dominique Demougin} and {Carsten Helm}},
year = {2022},
}
J. N. Meya, M. A. Drupp, S. Baumgärtner, and M. F. Quaas, "Inter- and Intragenerational Distribution and the Valuation of Natural Capital" Presented at SURED 2018 and WCERE 2018,2018.
@techreport{meya_inter-_2018, title = {Inter- and {Intragenerational} {Distribution} and the {Valuation} of {Natural} {Capital}},
url = {http://fleximeets.com/wcere2018/getpaper.php?fid=3377},
institution = {Presented at SURED 2018 and WCERE 2018,},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Drupp, Moritz A. and Baumgärtner, Stefan and Quaas, Martin F.},
year = {2018},
}
J. N. Meya, "Environmental inequality and economic valuation" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Working Papers V-416-18, 2018.
@techreport{meya_environmental_2018, type = {Working {Papers}},
title = {Environmental inequality and economic valuation},
url = {https://uol.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-416-18.pdf},
number = {V-416-18},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics},
author = {Meya, J. N.},
year = {2018},
C. Helm and M. Mier, "Subsidising Renewables but Taxing Storage? Second-Best Policies with Imperfect Carbon Pricing" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Working Papers V-413-18, 2018.
@techreport{helm_subsidising_2018, type = {Working {Papers}},
title = {Subsidising {Renewables} but {Taxing} {Storage}? {Second}-{Best} {Policies} with {Imperfect} {Carbon} {Pricing}},
url = {https://uol.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-413-18.pdf},
abstract = {We consider an economy in which competitive firms use three technologies for electricity production: pollutive fossils, intermittent renewables like wind or solar, and storage. We determine optimal subsidies for renewables and storage capacities when carbon pricing is imperfect. This policy is efficient for low market shares of intermittent renewables in the energy system, but it turns inefficient once there are sucient renewables to partly displace fossil electricity production at times of high availability. Moreover, the subsidy scheme is substantially more complex than a first-best Pigouvian tax. The optimal renewable subsidy is always positive but tends to decrease as electricity production becomes less reliant on fossils. The optimal storage subsidy even changes its sign. It is usually negative as long as fossils contribute to lling the storage, but turns positive if fossils are used only during times of low availability of renewables. This is because more storage capacity reduces the price during times of destorage, but raises it when electricity is taken from the market to fill the storage. This has countervailing effects on firms' incentives to invest in fossil capacities, and these effects are more pronounced the higher the round-trip effciency losses during a storage cycle.},
number = {V-413-18},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten and Mier, Mathias},
month = oct, year = {2018},
}
K. Eisenack and M. Mier, "Peak-load Pricing with Different Types of Dispatchability" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Working Papers V-411-18, 2018.
@techreport{eisenack_peak-load_2018, type = {Working {Papers}},
title = {Peak-load {Pricing} with {Different} {Types} of {Dispatchability}},
url = {https://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-411-18.pdf},
abstract = {We extend the theory of peak-load pricing by considering that the production with different technologies can be adjusted within their capacity at different speeds. In the established analysis, all production decisions can be made after the random variables realize. In our setting, in contrast, some decisions are made before, others after. We consider fixed load and three types of capacities: medium-dispatchable capacity needs to be scheduled ahead of actual production, non-dispatchable capacity produces randomly, and highly-dispatchable capacity can instantly adjust. If capacities differ in their dispatchability, some standard results of peak-load pricing break down, e.g., not all types of capacity will be employed. Either a system with medium-dispatchables only, or a system dominated by non-dispatchables and supplemented by highly-dispatchables occurs, where non- and highly-dispatchables could be substitutes or complements. For the latter system capacity decisions cannot be decentralized by markets since costs recovery is not possible.},
number = {V-411-18},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics},
author = {Eisenack, Klaus and Mier, Mathias},
month = jul, year = {2018},
keywords = {costs revcovery, dispatchability, energy trans, market design, peak-load pricing, renewable engergy},
}
M. Mier, "Policy Implications of a World with Renewables, Limited Dispatchability, and Fixed Load" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Working Papers V-412-18, 2018.
@techreport{mier_policy_2018, type = {Working {Papers}},
title = {Policy {Implications} of a {World} with {Renewables},
{Limited} {Dispatchability},
and {Fixed} {Load}},
url = {https://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-412-18.pdf},
abstract = {Most electricity systems face contractual fixed consumer prices in the short term, that is, load and price are fixed before the random supply of renewables like wind or solar realizes. Steam power plants also make production decisions before such a random supply realizes. These capacities cannot react instantly, which creates a demand for gas turbines to balance renewables. We approach these dynamics by considering different types of dispatchability in a more general framework of peak-load pricing and contribute to the debate on market design and capacity payments. Steam power always recovers costs, gas turbines never do so, and renewables might. We describe possible transfer schemes to overcome this problem and provide a more market-oriented solution. However, consumers must always be compensated for lost load.},
number = {V-412-18},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics},
author = {Mier, Mathias},
month = jul, year = {2018},
keywords = {cap, electricity market design, missing market, missing money, peak-load pricing, renewable energies},
}
J. Barth, K. Eisenack, U. Feudel, and J. N. Meya, "Dynamic quality regulation of the electricity grid" Presented at EAERE 2017 and IAEE 2017,2017.
@techreport{barth_dynamic_2017, title = {Dynamic quality regulation of the electricity grid},
url = {https://www.eeg.tuwien.ac.at/conference/iaee2017/files/paper/555_Barth_fullpaper_2017-06-29_10-58.pdf},
institution = {Presented at EAERE 2017 and IAEE 2017,},
author = {Barth, Jonathan and Eisenack, Klaus and Feudel, Ulrike and Meya, Jasper N},
year = {2017},
}
K. Eisenack and M. Paschen, "Designing long-lived investments under uncertain and ongoing change" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Working Papers V-398-17, 2017.
@techreport{eisenack_designing_2017, type = {Working {Papers}},
title = {Designing long-lived investments under uncertain and ongoing change},
url = {https://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-398-17.pdf},
abstract = {Shall investments become more robust or more short-lived if unfavorable exogeneous conditions become more uncertain? What if the investments' design is irreversible for its whole life time? Such decision problems are frequently encountered, for example in infrastructure construction. We analyze this problem by combining an irreversible design decision when the investment starts with an irreversible decision to abandon an outdated investment. We formulate the second decision as a stopping problem of stochastic dynamic control, derive the value function, and the comparative statics for an optimal design. We find a decreasing optimal expected life-time and decreasing robustness for more rapidly changing conditions if the original life-time is not too large. For rising uncertainty, originally shorter-lived investments' life-times are expanded. For more long-lived investments, these effects may reverse. There can be a case for making investments less robust in the light of uncertain and ongoing change.},
number = {V-398-17},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics},
author = {Eisenack, Klaus and Paschen, Marius},
year = {2017},
}
J. N. Meya and K. Eisenack, "Effectiveness of gaming for communicating and teaching climate change" Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, THESys Discussion Paper 2017-3, 2017.
@techreport{meya_effectiveness_2017, type = {{THESys} {Discussion} {Paper}},
title = {Effectiveness of gaming for communicating and teaching climate change},
url = {https://edoc.hu-berlin.de/bitstream/handle/18452/19316/THESysDP-2017-3.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y},
number = {2017-3},
institution = {Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin},
author = {Meya, Jasper N and Eisenack, Klaus},
year = {2017},
note = {Backup Publisher: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin},
}
J. N. Meya, M. A. Drupp, and N. Hanley, "Income inequality and the international transfer of environmental values" Kiel University, Department of Economics, Economics Working Paper 2017-03, 2017.
@techreport{meya_income_2017, type = {Economics {Working} {Paper}},
title = {Income inequality and the international transfer of environmental values},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
url = {https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/163521/1/894603361.pdf},
abstract = {How the valuation of environmental goods is related to income is a key question for environmental economics, but the role of income inequality is often neglected. We study how income inequality affects the international transfer of the valuation of environmental goods - a practice called value or benefit transfer. Specifically, we apply theory-driven transfer factors to examine whether adjusting for income inequality can reduce errors made in benefit transfer, drawing on a multi-country valuation study on water quality improvement. Our convergent validity analysis shows that income inequality adjustment reduces benefit transfer errors by more than 1.5 percentage points on average across all transfers. The adjustment for inequality is particularly important when income is distributed more unequally at the policy site relative to the study site, yielding reductions in transfer errors of up to 33 percentage points. Our results are relevant for policy appraisal, environmental accounting, and more generally for the role of income inequality in non-market valuation.},
language = {eng},
number = {2017-03},
institution = {Kiel University, Department of Economics},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Drupp, Moritz A. and Hanley, Nick},
year = {2017},
note = {Backup Publisher: CAU Kiel, Department of Economics},
keywords = {330, benefit transfer, convergent validity, D63, H43, income, inequality, Q25, Q51, Q53, stated preferences, transfer errors},
}
C. Helm and M. Mier, "Efficient diffusion of renewable energies: A roller-coaster ride" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Working Papers V-389-16, 2016.
@techreport{helm_efficient_2016, type = {Working {Papers}},
title = {Efficient diffusion of renewable energies: {A} roller-coaster ride},
url = {https://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-389-16.pdf},
abstract = {When the supply of intermittent renewable energies like wind and solar is high, the electricity price is low. Conversely, prices are high when their supply is low. This reduces the profit potential in renewable energies and, therefore, incentives to invest in renewable capacities. Nevertheless, we show that perfect competition and dynamic pricing lead to efficient choices of renewable and fossil capacities, provided that external costs of fossils are internalized by an appropriate tax. We also investigate some properties of electricity markets with intermittent renewables and examine the market diffusion of renewables as their capacity costs fall. We show that the intermittency of renewables causes an S-shaped diffusion pattern, implying that a rapid build-up of capacities is followed by a stage of substantially slower development. While this pattern is well known from the innovation literature, the mechanism is new. Moreover, the S-shaped pattern is followed by another acceleration phase towards the end of the diffusion process. We also find that technology improvements such as better storage capabilities have substantial effects not only on the speed of market penetration, but also on its pattern. Finally, fluctuations of energy prices rise with the share of renewables. If regulators respond with a price cap, this leads to a faster market diffusion of renewables.},
number = {V-389-16},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten and Mier, Mathias},
month = apr, year = {2016},
keywords = {intermittent energy sources, peak-load pricing, price caps, renewable energies, technology diffusion},
}
M. Paschen, "The effect of intermittent renewable supply on the forward premium in German electricity markets" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Working Papers V-397-16, 2016.
@techreport{paschen_effect_2016, type = {Working {Papers}},
title = {The effect of intermittent renewable supply on the forward premium in {German} electricity markets},
url = {https://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-397-16.pdf},
abstract = {Renewable energy such as wind or solar power currently contributes a large share to the total German electricity supply as a result of the German energy transition. This paper presents an empirical analysis of how power shocks resulting from intermittent renewable supply affect forward premiums in German electricity markets. We contribute to the existing literature by investigating determinants of forward premiums, thereby focusing on wind and on solar power. We find positive wind shock effects on forward premiums. This can be explained as a consequence of the merit order effect. The findings in this paper underline the need to introduce wind power futures at the EEX to reduce the risk mark-up for participants in forward markets.},
number = {V-397-16},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics},
author = {Paschen, Marius},
month = nov, year = {2016},
keywords = {Electricity Market, Forward Premiums, Intermittent Wind and Solar Power},
}
C. Helm and F. Wirl, "Climate policies with private information: The case for unilateral action" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Working Papers V-378-15, 2015.
@techreport{helm_climate_2015, type = {Working {Papers}},
title = {Climate policies with private information: {The} case for unilateral action},
url = {https://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-378-15.pdf},
abstract = {Countries often have private information about their willingness to pay for protecting the climate system and their cost of emission reductions. We use a principal-agent model to re-examine the economic case for unilateral action by individual countries, in our case of the principal. We ?nd that the incentive structure that arises in an incomplete information framework can motivate (i) unilateral action before contract negotiations, (ii) optimal contracts in which the principal accepts higher marginal abatement costs for herself, as well as (iii) overcompliance by the principal after the contract has been negotiated. Multilateral externalities and type-dependent outside options, which are characteristic for climate policies, play a crucial role to explain these results.},
number = {V-378-15},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten and Wirl, Franz},
month = apr, year = {2015},
keywords = {multilateral extern, private information, unilateral action, unilateral commitment, voluntary action},
}
C. Helm and F. Wirl, "The Principal-Agent Model with Multilateral Externalities: An Application to Climate Agreements" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics,2012.
@techreport{helm_principal-agent_2012, title = {The {Principal}-{Agent} {Model} with {Multilateral} {Externalities}: {An} {Application} to {Climate} {Agreements}},
url = {http://www.fiwi.uni-oldenburg.de/download/HelmWirl_Climate_short.pdf},
abstract = {We consider how a principal can contract with an agent if multilateral externalities are present. The motivating example is that of an international climate agreement given private information about the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for emissions abatement. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent and to assure his participation. Optimal contracts equalize marginal abatement costs and, thus, can be implemented by a system of competitive permit trading. Moreover, optimal contracts can include a boundary part (i.e., the endogenous, type dependent participation constraint is binding), which is not a copy of the outside option of no contract. Compared to this outside option, a contract can increase emissions of the principal for types with a low WTP, and reduce her payo§ for high types. Subsidies can be constant or even decreasing in emission reductions, and turn negative so that the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal.},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics,},
author = {Helm, Carsten and Wirl, Franz},
year = {2012},
keywords = {environmental agreements, mechanism design, multilateral externalities, private information, type-dependent outside options.},
}
C. Helm and S. Pichler, "Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Working Papers V-341-11, 2012.
@techreport{helm_climate_2012, type = {Working {Papers}},
title = {Climate {Policy} with {Technology} {Transfers} and {Permit} {Trading}},
url = {http://www.fiwi.uni-oldenburg.de/download/Helm_TechnologyGap_WP2012.pdf},
abstract = {In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in developing countries, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is bene cial for industrialized countries as long as they are permit buyers, and as long as they can target subsidies to additional\" investments. We also consider how TT a ects countries' non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and nd that it reduces overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates some results and explores some further comparative statics.},
number = {V-341-11},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten and Pichler, Stefan},
month = nov, year = {2012},
keywords = {emissions trading, international climate policy., technology transfer},
}
C. Helm and D. Demougin, "Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits in a Globalized World" University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, Working Papers V-348-12, 2012.
@techreport{helm_incentive_2012, type = {Working {Papers}},
title = {Incentive {Contracts} and {Efficient} {Unemployment} {Benefits} in a {Globalized} {World}},
url = {https://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-348-12.pdf},
abstract = {Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyse this issue in a principal-agent model, higher level of unemployment benefits improves the workers' position in wage bargaining, leading to stronger effort incentives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor market participation. Accordingly, there is a trade-off. We analyze how changes in the economic environment such as globalization and better educated workers affect this trade-off.},
number = {V-348-12},
institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten and Demougin, Dominique},
month = aug, year = {2012},
keywords = {globalization, incentive contracts, moral hazard, Nash bargaining, Unemployment benefits},
}
N. Marscheider and J. N. Meya, Die internationale Klimapolitik auf dem Smartphone. Globales Lernen am Beispiel des digitalen Planspiels KEEP COOL mobilLeverkusen: Barbara Budrich.
@InCollection{,
author = {N. Marscheider and Jasper N. Meya},
title = {Die internationale Klimapolitik auf dem Smartphone. Globales Lernen am Beispiel des digitalen Planspiels KEEP COOL mobil},
booktitle = {Mit Bildung die Welt verändern? Globales Lernen für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung},
publisher = {Barbara Budrich},
year = {2017},
editor = {Oliver Emde and Uwe Jakubczyk and Bernd Kappes and Bernd Overwien},
address = {Leverkusen},
}
C. Helm, A Policy for Trade and the Environment in a Global EconomyDelhi: B.R. Publishing.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm},
title = {A Policy for Trade and the Environment in a Global Economy},
booktitle = {Trade and Environment: Recent Controversies},
publisher = {B.R. Publishing},
year = {2003},
editor = {Hans Singer, Neelambar Hatti and Remeshwar Tandon},
series = {New World Order Series 21},
pages = {1039-1064},
address = {Delhi},
}
C. Helm and H. Schellnhuber, The Politics of the Science of Climate ChangeBerlin: Parey Buchverlag.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm and Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber},
title = {The Politics of the Science of Climate Change},
booktitle = {Climate of the 21. Century - Changes and Risks},
publisher = {Parey Buchverlag},
year = {2001},
editor = {José L. Lozán and Hartmut Graßl and Peter Hupfer},
pages = {364-367},
address = {Berlin},
}
C. Helm and M. Buck, Das internationale Regime zur Kontrolle des Handels mit gefährlichen AbfällenOpladen: Leske + Budrich.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm and Matthias Buck},
title = {Das internationale Regime zur Kontrolle des Handels mit gefährlichen Abfällen},
booktitle = {Ökonomie als Grundlage politischer Entscheidungen},
publisher = {Leske + Budrich},
year = {2001},
editor = {Jürgen Gabriel and Michael Neugart},
pages = {323-343},
address = {Opladen},
}
C. Helm and U. E. Simonis, Verteilungsgerechtigkeit in der internationalen Umweltpolitik. Theoretische Fundierung und exemplarische FormulierungFrankfurt a.M. Edition suhrkamp.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm and Udo E. Simonis},
title = {Verteilungsgerechtigkeit in der internationalen Umweltpolitik. Theoretische Fundierung und exemplarische Formulierung},
booktitle = {Politik im 21. Jahrhundert},
publisher = {Edition suhrkamp},
year = {2001},
editor = {Claus Leggewie and Richard Münch},
pages = {211-227},
address = {Frankfurt a.M.},
}
C. Helm, Sustainability and New Economic Policy Options - The Example of International Emissions TradingHeidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm},
title = {Sustainability and New Economic Policy Options - The Example of International Emissions Trading},
booktitle = {Internationalization of the Economy and Environmental Policy Options},
publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
year = {2001},
editor = {Paul J. J. Welfens},
pages = {193-196},
address = {Heidelberg},
}
C. Helm and H. Schellnhuber, Wissenschaftliche Aussagen zum Klimawandel - Zum politischen Umgang mit objektiv unsicheren Ergebnissen der KlimaforschungBerlin: Parey Buchverlag.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm and Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber},
title = {Wissenschaftliche Aussagen zum Klimawandel - Zum politischen Umgang mit objektiv unsicheren Ergebnissen der Klimaforschung},
booktitle = {Warnsignale aus der Klimaentwicklung - Wissenschaftliche Fakten},
publisher = {Parey Buchverlag},
year = {1998},
editor = {José L. Lozán and Hartmut Graßl and Peter Hupfer},
pages = {364-367},
address = {Berlin},
}
C. Helm, Zur gerechten Verteilung der Lasten des Klimaschutzes - Eine ökonomische PerspektiveJülich: Forschungszentrum.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm},
title = {Zur gerechten Verteilung der Lasten des Klimaschutzes - Eine ökonomische Perspektive},
booktitle = {Treibhausgasminderung in Deutschland zwischen nationalen Zielen und internationalen Verpflichtungen},
publisher = {Forschungszentrum},
year = {1998},
editor = {Egbert Läge and Peter Schaumann and Ulrich Fahl},
volume = {14},
series = {Schriften des Forschungszentrums Jülich},
pages = {69-86},
address = {Jülich},
}
C. Helm, Fair play im Treibhaus - Zur gerechten Verteilung von EmissionsrechtenBerlin: edition sigma.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm},
title = {Fair play im Treibhaus - Zur gerechten Verteilung von Emissionsrechten},
booktitle = {Zukunftsfähige Entwicklung - Herausforderungen an Wissenschaft und Politik},
publisher = {edition sigma},
year = {1997},
editor = {Frank Biermann and Sebastian Büttner and Carsten Helm},
pages = {205-220},
address = {Berlin},
}
C. Helm, Neue Themen für die WTO in der Globalisierung - Wettbewerbsordnung, Sozialstandards und UmweltschutzbestimmungenBonn: J.H.W. Dietz.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm},
title = {Neue Themen für die WTO in der Globalisierung - Wettbewerbsordnung, Sozialstandards und Umweltschutzbestimmungen},
booktitle = {Jahrbuch Arbeit und Technik},
publisher = {J.H.W. Dietz},
year = {1997},
editor = {Werner Fricke and Else Fricke},
pages = {275-285},
address = {Bonn},
}
C. Helm, F. Biermann, and S. Büttner, Elemente der Zukunftsfähigkeit - Eine EinleitungBerlin: edition sigma.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm and Frank Biermann and Sebastian Büttner},
title = {Elemente der Zukunftsfähigkeit - Eine Einleitung},
booktitle = {Zukunftsfähige Entwicklung - Herausforderungen an Wissenschaft und Politik},
publisher = {edition sigma},
year = {1996},
editor = {Frank Biermann and Sebastian Büttner and Carsten Helm},
pages = {15-28},
address = {Berlin},
}
C. Helm, Umwelt- und Handelspolitik in einer globalisierten WirtschaftBerlin: edition sigma.
@InCollection{,
author = {Carsten Helm},
title = {Umwelt- und Handelspolitik in einer globalisierten Wirtschaft},
booktitle = {Weltumweltpolitik - Grundriß und Bausteine eines neuen Politikfeldes},
publisher = {edition sigma},
year = {1996},
editor = {Udo E. Simonis},
pages = {219-242},
address = {Berlin},
}
Go to documentHelm and Wirl, "Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation" Journal of Economics 132.1: 41-65..