Helm und Wirl, "Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation" Journal of Economics 132.1: 41-65. 2021.
@article{helm_multitasking_2021, title = {Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation},
url = {https://link.springer.com/epdf/10.1007/s00712-020-00713-9?sharing_token=hsiAoRvipABymYl7keJW4fe4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY4ZLKhI-K-dfCaJp9cl6gn12ZVMnTzFutB-mhqIwZZx4fhZn6wmiK8yAR7yNqEwJ8aixK26UrVPU8q7PoIRtlfo2eTBzwvYYTXxixRa-LQH63X5YbVJO_bk_hBLkFTc8K4=},
journal = {Journal of Economics 132.1: 41-65.},
author = {{Helm} and {Wirl}},
year = {2021},
}
C. Helm und M. Mier, "Steering the Energy Transition in a World of Intermittent Electricity Supply: Optimal Subsidiesand Taxes for Renewables and Storage" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2021.
@article{helm_steering_2021, title = {Steering the {Energy} {Transition} in a {World} of {Intermittent} {Electricity} {Supply}: {Optimal} {Subsidiesand} {Taxes} for {Renewables} and {Storage}},
issn = {0095-0696},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069621000711},
abstract = {Spurred by substantial subsidies, renewable energies have reduced their costs and captured a steadily growing market share. However, the variability of solar and wind power leads to new challenges for power systems. Policy instruments for steering the energy transition towards a zero-carbon future must account for this. We consider an economy in which competitive firms use pollutive fossils, intermittent renewables, and storage for electricity production. A Pigouvian tax is still efficient, because price fluctuations that result from intermittent renewables provide sufficient incentives to invest in storage capacities. However, governments have proved reluctant to impose carbon taxes. Therefore, we examine second-best subsidies when carbon pricing is imperfect. The optimal subsidy rate for renewables decreases as electricity production becomes less reliant on fossils. The optimal storage subsidy is usually negative as long as fossils are dispatched while filling the storage, but turns positive thereafter. This is because more storage capacity reduces the price when stored electricity is supplied to the market, but raises it when storage adds to demand. This has countervailing effects on firms’ incentives to invest in fossil capacities. A numerical simulation illustrates that substantial subsidy payments are required even after fossils have been completely driven out of the market.},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
author = {Helm, Carsten and Mier, Mathias},
year = {2021},
}
Carsten Helm und Mathias Mier, "On the efficient market diffusion of intermittent renewable energies"
Energy Economics, 2019.
doi:
10.1016/j.eneco.2019.01.017@article{carsten_helm_efficient_2019, title = {On the efficient market diffusion of intermittent renewable energies},
issn = {0140-9883},
doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2019.01.017},
abstract = {Capacity costs of renewable energies have been decreasing dramatically and are expected to fall further, making them more competitive with fossils. Building on an analytically tractable peak-load pricing model, we analyze how intermittency of renewable energies aects the market diusion that results from these lower costs. In particular, once renewables have become competitive by attaining the same levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) as fossils, the marginal increase in ecient capacities due to a further cost reduction varies substantially. Initially it is small, then it rises, but it falls again once renewable capacities are large enough to satisfy the whole electricity demand at times of high availability. If external costs of fossils are internalized by a Pigouvian tax, then perfect competition leads to ecient investments in renewable and fossil capacities; even though we assume that only a subgroup of consumers can adapt their demand to price uctuations that are caused by the intermittency of renewables. Moreover, fossils receive a capacity payment through the market for their reliability in serving demand of non-reactive consumers. Maximum electricity prices rise with the share of renewables. If regulators impose a price cap, this initially raises investments in renewables, but the eect may reverse if the share of renewables is large.},
journal = {Energy Economics},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Mathias Mier}},
year = {2019},
keywords = {energy transition, intermittent energy sources, peak-load pricing, price caps, renewable energies, technology diffusion},
}
Moritz A. Drupp, Jasper N. Meya, Stefan Baumgärtner, und Martin F. Quaas, "Economic inequality and the value of nature"
Ecological Economics, vol. 150, 2018.
doi:
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.029@article{moritz_a_drupp_economic_2018, title = {Economic inequality and the value of nature},
volume = {150},
doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.029},
abstract = {Understanding what influences the value of nature is crucial for informing environmental policy. From a sustainability perspective, economic valuation should not only seek to determine willingness to pay for environmental goods to devise an efficient allocation of scarce resources, but should also account for distributional effects to ensure justice. Yet, how economic inequality affects the value of non-market environmental goods remains understudied. Combining recently developed theoretical results with empirical evidence we show that more equal societies have a higher valuation for environmental public goods and that non-market benefits of environmental policy accrue over-proportionally to poorer households. On this ground, we identify a number of fruitful areas for future research and discuss implications for environmental valuation, management and policy-making. We conclude that environmental valuation should explicitly account for economic inequality, and that encompassing assessments of the distributional effects of environmental policies must consider the distribution of non-market environmental benefits.},
journal = {Ecological Economics},
author = {{Moritz A. Drupp} and {Jasper N. Meya} and {Stefan Baumgärtner} and {Martin F. Quaas}},
year = {2018},
keywords = {330, distribution, Environmental goods, H43, income inequality, nature conservation, Q01, Q51, Q56, Q57, valuation, Willingness to pay},
pages = {340--345},
}
J. N. Meya und K. Eisenack, "Effectiveness of gaming for communicating and teaching climate change"
Climatic Change, vol. 149, iss. 3, 2018.
doi:
10.1007/s10584-018-2254-7@article{meya_effectiveness_2018, title = {Effectiveness of gaming for communicating and teaching climate change},
volume = {149},
issn = {1573-1480},
doi = {10.1007/s10584-018-2254-7},
abstract = {Games are increasingly proposed as an innovative way to convey scientific insights on the climate-economic system to students, non-experts, and the wider public. Yet, it is not clear if games can meet such expectations. We present quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of a simulation game for communicating and teaching international climate politics. We use a sample of over 200 students from Germany playing the simulation game KEEP COOL. We combine pre- and postgame surveys on climate politics with data on individual in-game decisions. Our key findings are that gaming increases the sense of personal responsibility, the confidence in politics for climate change mitigation, and makes more optimistic about international cooperation in climate politics. Furthermore, players that do cooperate less in the game become more optimistic about international cooperation but less confident about politics. These results are relevant for the design of future games, showing that effective climate games do not require climate-friendly in-game behavior as a winning condition. We conclude that simulation games can facilitate experiential learning about the difficulties of international climate politics and thereby complement both conventional communication and teaching methods.},
number = {3},
journal = {Climatic Change},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Eisenack, Klaus},
year = {2018},
pages = {319--333},
}
J. N. Meya, U. Kornek, und K. Lessmann, "How empirical uncertainties influence the stability of climate coalitions"
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 18, iss. 2, 2018.
doi:
10.1007/s10784-017-9378-5@article{meya_how_2018, title = {How empirical uncertainties influence the stability of climate coalitions},
volume = {18},
issn = {1573-1553},
doi = {10.1007/s10784-017-9378-5},
abstract = {International climate agreements are negotiated in the face of uncertainties concerning the costs and benefits of abatement and in the presence of incentives for free-riding. Numerical climate coalition models provide estimates of the challenges affecting cooperation, but often resort to assuming certainty with respect to the values of model parameters. We study the impact of uncertainty on the stability of coalitions in the Model of International Climate Agreements using the technique of Monte Carlo analysis. We extend the existing literature by (1) calibrating parametric uncertainty about damages and abatement costs to estimates from meta-studies and by (2) explicitly considering uncertainty in the curvature of the damage function. We find that stability is more sensitive to uncertainty in damages than in abatement costs and most sensitive to uncertainty about the regional distribution of damages. Our calculations suggest that heterogeneity can increase stability of coalitions; however, this depends on the availability of transfers.},
number = {2},
journal = {International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Kornek, Ulrike and Lessmann, Kai},
year = {2018},
pages = {175--198},
}
J. N. Meya und L. Bethlehem, "Global spielen, lokal handeln? Simulation der Rolle von Städten im Klimawandel mit dem digitalen Planspiel KEEP COOL mobil" Die Niedersächsische Gemeinde, iss. 2, 2017.
@article{meya_global_2017, title = {Global spielen, lokal handeln? {Simulation} der {Rolle} von {Städten} im {Klimawandel} mit dem digitalen {Planspiel} {KEEP} {COOL} mobil},
url = {http://www.climate-game.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/MeyaBethlehem_2017_Global-spielen-lokal-handeln_DNG.pdf},
number = {2},
journal = {Die Niedersächsische Gemeinde},
author = {Meya, J. N. and Bethlehem, L.},
year = {2017},
pages = {9--10},
}
Nils Droste und Jasper N. Meya, "Ecosystem services in infrastructure planning a case study of the projected deepening of the Lower Weser river in Germany"
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, vol. 60, iss. 2, 2017.
doi:
10.1080/09640568.2016.1151405@article{nils_droste_ecosystem_2017, title = {Ecosystem services in infrastructure planning a case study of the projected deepening of the {Lower} {Weser} river in {Germany}},
volume = {60},
doi = {10.1080/09640568.2016.1151405},
abstract = {We consider how ecosystem services can be incorporated into water infrastructure planning by studying the projected deepening of the Lower Weser river channel in Germany. We recalculate the project's benefitcost ratio by integrating the monetary value of changes in different ecosystem services, as follows: (1) the restoration costs of a mitigation measure for a loss in fresh water supply for agricultural production in the estuary region, (2) the costs of a loss in habitat services, transferring the willingness to pay from a contingent valuation study to the area assessed in the environmental impact assessment, and (3) the benefits of emissions savings induced by more efficient shipping, taking a marginal abatement cost approach. We find that including monetary values for ecosystem service changes leads to a substantial drop in the benefitcost ratio. On this basis, we argue for a reform of the standard costbenefit analysis to facilitate more complete welfare assessments.},
number = {2},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Planning and Management},
author = {{Nils Droste} and {Jasper N. Meya}},
year = {2017},
pages = {231--248},
}
Stefan Baumgärtner, Moritz A. Drupp, Jasper N. Meya, Jan M. Munz, und Martin F. Quaas, "Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 85, 2017.
doi:
10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.005@article{stefan_baumgartner_income_2017, title = {Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods},
volume = {85},
issn = {0095-0696},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069617302450},
doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.005},
abstract = {We study how the distribution of income among members of society, and income inequality in particular, affects social willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental public goods. We find that social WTP for environmental goods decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only if environmental goods and manufactured goods are substitutes (complements). We derive adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in income distributions between a study site and a policy site. For illustration, we quantify how social WTP for environmental public goods depends on the respective income distributions for empirical case studies in Sweden and the World at large. We find that the adjustment for income inequality can be substantial.},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
author = {{Stefan Baumgärtner} and {Moritz A. Drupp} and {Jasper N. Meya} and {Jan M. Munz} and {Martin F. Quaas}},
year = {2017},
keywords = {Benefit transfer, Environmental goods, Income distribution, Inequality, Public goods, Sustainability policy, Willingness to pay},
pages = {35--61},
A. Lillie und J. N. Meya, "Beitrag der politischen Bildung zur Bildung für nachhaltige Entwicklung" polis, iss. 1, 2016.
@article{lillie_beitrag_2016, title = {Beitrag der politischen {Bildung} zur {Bildung} für nachhaltige {Entwicklung}},
number = {1},
journal = {polis},
author = {Lillie, Anna-Lena and Meya, Jasper N.},
year = {2016},
pages = {11--14},
}
J. N. Meya und L. Meya, "Das Klima aufs Spiel setzen. Simulation der internationalen Klimaverhandlungen mit dem Planspiel KEEP COOL"
GWP - Gesellschaft-Wirtschaft-Politik, iss. 2, 2016.
doi:
10.3224/gwp.v65i2.24022@article{meya_klima_2016, title = {Das {Klima} aufs {Spiel} setzen. {Simulation} der internationalen {Klimaverhandlungen} mit dem {Planspiel} {KEEP} {COOL}},
doi = {10.3224/gwp.v65i2.24022},
number = {2},
journal = {GWP - Gesellschaft-Wirtschaft-Politik},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Meya, Lukas},
year = {2016},
pages = {249--259},
}
J. N. Meya, N. Droste, und B. Klauer, "Methodische Defizite der Umweltbewertung im Bundesverkehrswegeplan 2030" WasserWirtschaft, iss. 10, 2016.
@article{meya_methodische_2016, title = {Methodische {Defizite} der {Umweltbewertung} im {Bundesverkehrswegeplan} 2030},
url = {https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jasper_Meya/publication/309284167_Methodische_Defizite_der_Umweltbewertung_im_Bundesverkehrswegeplan_2030/links/595ba3b50f7e9bf415b49573/Methodische-Defizite-der-Umweltbewertung-im-Bundesverkehrswegeplan-2030.pdf},
number = {10},
journal = {WasserWirtschaft},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Droste, Nils and Klauer, Bernd},
year = {2016},
pages = {57--58},
}
J. N. Meya, P. Neetzow, L. Neubauer, und A. Pechan, "Die Menge machts? Das EEG 2017 und die Folgen für die deutsche Energiewende" ET - Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, vol. 66, iss. 11, 2016.
@article{meya_menge_2016, title = {Die {Menge} machts? {Das} {EEG} 2017 und die {Folgen} für die deutsche {Energiewende}},
volume = {66},
url = {http://dezentral2015.apps-1and1.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Meya_et_al_2016.pdf},
number = {11},
journal = {ET - Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen},
author = {Meya, Jasper N. and Neetzow, Paul and Neubauer, Linda and Pechan, Anna},
year = {2016},
pages = {34--37},
}
Carsten Helm und Franz Wirl, "Climate Policies with Private Information: The Case for Unilateral Action"
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3, iss. 4, 2016.
doi:
10.1086/688583@article{carsten_helm_climate_2016, title = {Climate {Policies} with {Private} {Information}: {The} {Case} for {Unilateral} {Action}},
volume = {3},
doi = {10.1086/688583},
abstract = {AbstractCountries often have private information about their willingness to pay for protecting the climate system. We use a principal-agent model to reexamine the economic case for unilateral action by individual countries, in our case of the principal. We find that the incentive structure that arises in an incomplete information framework may lead to a more positive assessment of unilateral action than in papers that neglect private information. First, we find that a unilateral commitment to emission reductions that is made before contract negotiations always reduces aggregate emissions, in contrast to the results in the seminal contribution by Hoel. Second, we show that the principal often has an interest to unilaterally reduce emissions below the level to which she would be obliged under the standard contract solution. Hence we provide an economic rationale for overcompliance. Multilateral externalities and type-dependent outside options, which are characteristic for climate policies, play a crucial role to explain these results.},
number = {4},
journal = {Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Franz Wirl}},
year = {2016},
pages = {893--916},
}
Carsten Helm und Franz Wirl, "Multilateral externalities: Contracts with private information either about costs or benefits"
Economics Letters, vol. 141, 2016.
doi:
10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.020@article{carsten_helm_multilateral_2016, title = {Multilateral externalities: {Contracts} with private information either about costs or benefits},
volume = {141},
issn = {0165-1765},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516300040},
doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.020},
abstract = {Abstract This note uses the framework of Martimort and Sand-Zantmann (2013, forthcoming) about international environmental agreements. The objective is to demonstrate how a shift of private information from cost to benefit affects contracts and permit market outcomes although this seemingly ad hoc choice has no effect outside contracts and absent market interventions.},
journal = {Economics Letters},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Franz Wirl}},
year = {2016},
keywords = {Business as usual, Contracts, Difference due to allocation of private information, Out-of-contract, Permit market, Principalagent},
pages = {27--31},
}
Marius Paschen, "Dynamic analysis of the German day-ahead electricity spot market"
Energy Economics, vol. 59, 2016.
doi:
10.1016/j.eneco.2016.07.019@article{marius_paschen_dynamic_2016, title = {Dynamic analysis of the {German} day-ahead electricity spot market},
volume = {59},
issn = {0140-9883},
url = {//www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988316301918},
doi = {10.1016/j.eneco.2016.07.019},
abstract = {Abstract This paper analyzes the dynamic behavior of day-ahead spot prices in the German electricity spot market due to positive structural shocks in wind and solar power. It uses a dynamic structural vector autoregressive model to estimate the related structural impulse response functions. The estimates suggest that wind power shocks have a more prolonged negative effect on spot prices than solar power shocks. Significant autocorrelations of wind power for larger lags indicate these results. The total negative merit order effect of a solar power shock is larger when using a reasonable model specification. One reason might be that solar power shocks coincide with demand peaks. However, results regarding the relation of the effects of wind and solar should be dealt with carefully because these results do not hold for all specifications. Past static estimates show differences in the total average negative merit order effects. These estimates might be overstated if wind and solar power dynamics are transferred to the merit order effects.},
journal = {Energy Economics},
author = {{Marius Paschen}},
year = {2016},
keywords = {Electricity market, solar power dynamics, Spot prices, Structural impulse response functions, Structural vector autoregressive model, Wind},
pages = {118--128},
}
L. Meya und J. N. Meya, "Schuldenstreit. Ein Konferenzspiel zur Griechenlandkrise" polis, iss. 3, 2015.
@article{meya_schuldenstreit_2015, title = {Schuldenstreit. {Ein} {Konferenzspiel} zur {Griechenlandkrise}},
number = {3},
journal = {polis},
author = {Meya, L. and Meya, J. N.},
year = {2015},
pages = {20--24},
}
Carsten Helm und Stefan Pichler, "Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading" Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 60, 2015.
@article{carsten_helm_climate_2015-1, title = {Climate {Policy} with {Technology} {Transfers} and {Permit} {Trading}},
volume = {60},
url = {http://rdcu.be/mFGb},
abstract = {In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the South, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is beneficial for the North as long as it is a permit buyer; hence it chooses to subsidize TT. By contrast, the permit selling South suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates, despite receiving subsidies. We also consider how TT affects countries' non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and nd that it tends to reduce overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates some results and explores some further comparative statics.},
journal = {Environmental and Resource Economics},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Stefan Pichler}},
year = {2015},
keywords = {emissions trading, international climate policy, technology transfer},
pages = {37--54},
}
Carsten Helm und Robert C. Schmidt, "Climate cooperation with technology investments and border carbon adjustment"
European Economic Review, vol. 75, 2015.
doi:
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.01.007@article{carsten_helm_climate_2015, title = {Climate cooperation with technology investments and border carbon adjustment},
volume = {75},
issn = {0014-2921},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292115000082},
doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.01.007},
abstract = {Abstract A central question in climate policy is whether early investments in low-carbon technologies are a useful first step towards a more effective climate agreement in the future. We introduce a climate cooperation model with endogenous R\&D investments where countries protect their international competitiveness via border carbon adjustments (BCA). 5BCA6 raises the scope for cooperation and leads to a non-trivial relation between countries? prior R\&D investments and participation in the coalition. We find that early investments in R\&D render free-riding more attractive. Therefore, with delayed cooperation on emission abatement and ex-ante R\&D investments, the outcome is often characterized by high participation but inefficiently low technology investments and abatement.},
journal = {European Economic Review},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Robert C. Schmidt}},
year = {2015},
keywords = {Border carbon adjustment, Border tax adjustment, Climate treaty, Coalitions, R\&D},
pages = {112--130},
}
Carsten Helm und Franz Wirl, "The principalagent model with multilateral externalities: An application to climate agreements"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 67, iss. 2, 2014.
doi:
10.1016/j.jeem.2013.11.006@article{carsten_helm_principalagent_2014, title = {The principalagent model with multilateral externalities: {An} application to climate agreements},
volume = {67},
issn = {0095-0696},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069613001241},
doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2013.11.006},
abstract = {Abstract We consider contracting of a principal with an agent if multilateral externalities are present. The motivating example is that of an international climate agreement given private information about the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for emissions abatement. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent and to assure his participation. Optimal contracts equalize marginal abatement costs and, thus, can be implemented by a system of competitive permit trading. Moreover, optimal contracts can include a boundary part (i.e., the endogenous, type dependent participation constraint is binding), which is not a copy of the outside option of no contract. Compared to this outside option, a contract can increase emissions of the principal for types with a low WTP, and reduce her payoff for high types. Subsidies can be constant or even decreasing in emission reductions, and turn negative so that the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal.},
number = {2},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Franz Wirl}},
year = {2014},
keywords = {Environmental agreements, Mechanism design, Multilateral externalities, Private information, Type-dependent outside options},
pages = {141--154},
}
Carsten Helm und Michael Neugart, "Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information" Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), vol. 169, iss. 3, 2013.
@article{carsten_helm_coalition_2013, title = {Coalition {Governments} and {Policy} {Reform} with {Asymmetric} {Information}},
volume = {169},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/jinste/urnsici0932-4569(201309)1693_383cgaprw_2.0.tx_2-u.html},
abstract = {With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by government members with heterogeneous policy preferences, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. This provides a rationale why coalition governments may find it easier to implement reforms than single-party governments, why oversized coalitions are formed, and why governments sometimes have cabinet members from opposing parties.},
number = {3},
journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Michael Neugart}},
year = {2013},
pages = {383--406},
}
D. Demougin und C. Helm, "Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard" European Economic Review, vol. 55, iss. 7, 2011.
@article{demougin_job_2011, title = {Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard},
volume = {55},
issn = {0014-2921},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v55y2011i7p964-979.html},
abstract = {We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers' outside option. The latter is improved for low-skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high-skilled workers. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches, which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.},
number = {7},
journal = {European Economic Review},
author = {Demougin, Dominique and Helm, Carsten},
year = {2011},
keywords = {Incentive contracts, Job matching, Moral hazard, Nash bargaining, Unemployment benefits},
pages = {964--979},
}
J. C. Carbone, C. Helm, und T. F. Rutherford, "The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy" Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 58, iss. 3, 2009.
@article{carbone_case_2009, title = {The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy},
volume = {58},
issn = {0095-0696},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeeman/v58y2009i3p266-280.html},
abstract = {We evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design of national abatement policies. Countries' decisions about their participation in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made non-cooperatively; so a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement agreements or that participation will result in significant environmental gains. Despite this, we find that emission trade agreements can be effective; that smaller groupings pairing developing and developed-world partners often perform better than agreements with larger rosters; and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these outcomes.},
number = {3},
journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
author = {Carbone, Jared C. and Helm, Carsten and Rutherford, Thomas F.},
year = {2009},
keywords = {Global warming Coalitions General equilibrium Tradable permits},
pages = {266--280},
}
Carsten Helm und Anja Schöttner, "Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R\&D Spillovers" German Economic Review, vol. 9, 2008.
@article{carsten_helm_subsidizing_2008, title = {Subsidizing {Technological} {Innovations} in the {Presence} of {R}\&{D} {Spillovers}},
volume = {9},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/germec/v9y2008ip339-353.html},
abstract = {We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms to produce an output, for example electricity from renewable energy sources. Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production cost of the output. Part of these investments spills over and also reduces production cost of the other firm. Comparing a general price subsidy and an innovation tournament, we find that the principal's expected cost of implementing a given expected output is always higher under the tournament, even though this scheme may lead to more innovation. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008.},
journal = {German Economic Review},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Anja Schöttner}},
year = {2008},
pages = {339--353},
}
C. Böhringer und C. Helm, "On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost" Resource and Energy Economics, vol. 30, iss. 2, 2008.
@article{bohringer_fair_2008, title = {On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost},
volume = {30},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/resene/v30y2008i2p260-276.html},
abstract = {This paper introduces a solution for the fair division of emission reduction costs in the climate change regime. Our primary focus is on the fair division of efficiency gains that arise from exchanging the initial allocation of emission entitlements, rather than the initial allocation itself. We propose to complement the competitive Walrasian solution with welfare bounds, the ethical justification of which rests on commonality of ownership. Simulations with an intertemporal computable general equilibrium model illustrate the relevance of such welfare bounds. For a wide range of initial allocations of emission entitlements - including an equal per capita allocation - we find that developing countries should be fully compensated for their emission abatement efforts, but should not receive any further transfers.},
number = {2},
journal = {Resource and Energy Economics},
author = {Böhringer, Christoph and Helm, Carsten},
year = {2008},
pages = {260--276},
}
C. Helm, "Fair division theory and climate change policy" Environment and Development Economics, vol. 13, iss. 04, 2008.
@article{helm_fair_2008, title = {Fair division theory and climate change policy},
volume = {13},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/endeec/v13y2008i04p441-455_00.html},
abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.},
number = {04},
journal = {Environment and Development Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten},
year = {2008},
pages = {441--455},
}
C. Helm, "How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods" International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 28, iss. 4, 2008.
@article{helm_how_2008, title = {How liable should an exporter be?: {The} case of trade in hazardous goods},
volume = {28},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v28y2008i4p263-271.html},
abstract = {This paper analyzes liability issues in the context of internationally traded goods like hazardous waste. It focuses on waste disposers of a small open economy that are judgement-proof due to either wealth constraints or regulatory liability limits. In this case, the extension of liability to waste exporters distorts the factor allocation and may reduce disposal care. Hence the optimal extension is partial at most. However, extending liability increases incentives of the waste importing country to hold domestic disposers liable. Interaction through the price system and through contracts that condition payments for disposal services on the occurrence of an accident yield identical outcomes if disposers are judgement-proof.},
number = {4},
journal = {International Review of Law and Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten},
year = {2008},
keywords = {Extended liability Hazardous waste trade Externalities Moral hazard},
pages = {263--271},
}
Dominique Demougin und Carsten Helm, "Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power" German Economic Review, vol. 7, 2006.
@article{dominique_demougin_moral_2006, title = {Moral {Hazard} and {Bargaining} {Power}},
volume = {7},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/germec/v7y2006ip463-470.html},
abstract = {We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent's outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent's bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006.},
journal = {German Economic Review},
author = {{Dominique Demougin} and {Carsten Helm}},
year = {2006},
pages = {463--470},
}
Dominique Demougin, Claude Fluet, und Carsten Helm, "Output and wages with inequality averse agents" Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 39, iss. 2, 2006.
@article{dominique_demougin_output_2006, title = {Output and wages with inequality averse agents},
volume = {39},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v39y2006i2p399-413.html},
abstract = {We analyse a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract that, owing to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other agent resents. We show that greater inequality aversion unambiguously decreases total output and therefore average labour productivity. More specifically, inequality aversion reduces effort, wage, and payoff of agent 1. Effects on wage and effort of agent 2 depend on whether effort levels across tasks are substitutes or complements in the firm's output function.},
number = {2},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics},
author = {{Dominique Demougin} and {Claude Fluet} and {Carsten Helm}},
year = {2006},
pages = {399--413},
}
C. Helm, "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices" Journal of Public Economics, vol. 87, iss. 12, 2003.
@article{helm_international_2003, title = {International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices},
volume = {87},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v87y2003i12p2737-2747.html},
abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.},
number = {12},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
author = {Helm, Carsten},
year = {2003},
pages = {2737--2747},
}
Carsten Helm und Udo E. Simonis, "Distributive Justice in International Environmental Policy: Axiomatic Foundation and Exemplary Formulation" Environmental Values, vol. 10, iss. 1, 2001.
@article{carsten_helm_distributive_2001, title = {Distributive {Justice} in {International} {Environmental} {Policy}: {Axiomatic} {Foundation} and {Exemplary} {Formulation}},
volume = {10},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/env/journl/ev10ev1001.html},
abstract = {Proceeding on a limited number of general, widely accepted equity criteria, we develop a proposal for distributing common resources. In particular, the proposed fair division mechanism is individually rational, envy-free, Pareto-efficient and satisfies the stand alone test, which follows as a minimum requirement from the resource and population monotonicity criteria. Applied to international climate policy, the thrust of this proposal is that the South should initially be fully compensated for the greenhouse gas abatement measures it is to undertake as a result of efficiency considerations.},
number = {1},
journal = {Environmental Values},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Udo E. Simonis}},
year = {2001},
keywords = {climate change, common resources, equity, fair division},
pages = {5--18},
}
Carsten Helm, "On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities" International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 30, iss. 1, 2001.
@article{carsten_helm_existence_2001, title = {On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities},
volume = {30},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v30y2001i1p141-146.html},
abstract = {This paper analyzes a game in coalitional form that is derived from a simple economy with multilateral externalities. Following Chander and Tulkens (1997) we assume that agents react to a blocking coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. A non-empty core of this game is established by showing that the game is balanced. The proof relies only on standard convexity assumptions and, therefore, substantially generalizes the results in Chander and Tulkens (1997).},
number = {1},
journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
author = {{Carsten Helm}},
year = {2001},
keywords = {coalitional games},
pages = {141--146},
}
Carsten Helm und Detlef Sprinz, "Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 44, iss. 5, 2000.
doi:
10.1177/0022002700044005004@article{carsten_helm_measuring_2000, title = {Measuring the {Effectiveness} of {International} {Environmental} {Regimes}},
volume = {44},
doi = {10.1177/0022002700044005004},
abstract = {Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international governance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measurement concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the measurement concept is demonstrated by way of two international treaties regulating transboundary air pollution in Europe. The results demonstrate that the regimes indeed show positive effects–but fall substantially short of the collective optima.},
number = {5},
journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Detlef Sprinz}},
year = {2000},
pages = {630--652},
}
Carsten Helm, Thomas Bruckner, Gerhard Petschel-Held, Ferenc L. Toth, Hans Martin Füssel, Marian Leimbach, und Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, "Climate Change Decision-Support and the Tolerable Windows Approach" Environmental Modeling and Assessment, vol. 4, iss. 4, 1999.
@article{carsten_helm_climate_1999, title = {Climate {Change} {Decision}-{Support} and the {Tolerable} {Windows} {Approach}},
volume = {4},
url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33637/},
number = {4},
journal = {Environmental Modeling and Assessment},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Thomas Bruckner} and {Gerhard Petschel-Held} and {Ferenc L. Toth} and {Hans Martin Füssel} and {Marian Leimbach} and {Hans Joachim Schellnhuber}},
year = {1999},
pages = {217--234},
}
Carsten Helm, Thomas Bruckner, und Ferenc Toth, "Value judgments and the choice of climate protection strategies" International Journal of Social Economics, vol. 26, iss. 7/8/9, 1999.
@article{carsten_helm_value_1999, title = {Value judgments and the choice of climate protection strategies},
volume = {26},
url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33636/},
number = {7/8/9},
journal = {International Journal of Social Economics},
author = {{Carsten Helm} and {Thomas Bruckner} and {Ferenc Toth}},
year = {1999},
pages = {974--1021},
}
Detlef F. Sprinz und Carsten Helm, "The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement Concept" International Political Science Review? Revue internationale de science pol, vol. 20, iss. 4, 1999.
@article{detlef_f_sprinz_effect_1999, title = {The {Effect} of {Global} {Environmental} {Regimes}: {A} {Measurement} {Concept}},
volume = {20},
abstract = {The article outlines a method to measure the effect which international regimes have on solving global environmental problems such as global climate change. By using political-economic cost/benefit analysis, a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum (lower and upper bounds) are derived. By comparing the actual performance of a regime to these bounds, a simple coefficient of regime effectiveness can be computed. After theoretically deriving the various bounds, the authors discuss the determining factors and provide guidance on how such a research agenda could be pursued empirically. The authors conclude with suggestions to further refine the measurement concept and its merit for public policy.},
number = {4},
journal = {International Political Science Review? Revue internationale de science pol},
author = {{Detlef F. Sprinz} and {Carsten Helm}},
year = {1999},
pages = {359--369},
}
Carsten Helm, "International Cooperation Behind the Veil of Uncertainty – The Case of Transboundary Acidification" Environmental & Resource Economics, vol. 12, iss. 2, 1998.
@article{carsten_helm_international_1998, title = {International {Cooperation} {Behind} the {Veil} of {Uncertainty} – {The} {Case} of {Transboundary} {Acidification}},
volume = {12},
url = {http://rdcu.be/mLeb},
abstract = {The complexities of international environmental problems are only poorly understood. Hence, decision makers have to negotiate about abatement measures even though they do not know the 'true' model of the ecological system and have only a rough idea about the costs and benefits of their action. It will be analysed to what extent this kind of 'model uncertainty' – where players do not only have incomplete information about the payoff functions of the other players, but also about their own payoff function – affects the prospects of international cooperation. Using a simple game-theoretic model, it is shown how countries can use the veil of uncertainty to hide their distributional interests. The arguments are based on a deviation from the common prior assumption, which seems particularly questionable in a setting comprising various countries with different cultural and scientific backgrounds. Finally the model will prove useful to quantitatively and qualitatively illustrate the central role of model uncertainty in the negotiations of the first Sulphur Protocol signed to combat transboundary acidification. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998},
number = {2},
journal = {Environmental \& Resource Economics},
author = {{Carsten Helm}},
year = {1998},
keywords = {acid rain, international negotiations, model uncertainty, transboundary pollution},
pages = {185--201},
}
Carsten Helm, "Transboundary environmental problems and new trade rules" International Journal of Social Economics, vol. 23, iss. 8, 1996.
@article{carsten_helm_transboundary_1996, title = {Transboundary environmental problems and new trade rules},
volume = {23},
url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33639/},
abstract = {Increased environmental pollution and the globalization of economies have initiated an academic debate on the relationship between international trade and the environment. Addresses the question of whether the present GATT/WTO regime conflicts with effective policies to cope with transboundary environmental problems, including the protection of global commons. Analyses the welfare effects of transboundary pollution tariffs by using a simple partial equilibrium framework. Contrasts the results with an assessment of the existing GATT/WTO regime, in which no distinction between national and transboundary environmental problems has been made. Outlines, in conclusion, some basic elements of a necessary reform of the GATT/WTO regime. These proposals would allow border tax adjustment for certain types of production-related environmental charge without undermining an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system.},
number = {8},
journal = {International Journal of Social Economics},
author = {{Carsten Helm}},
year = {1996},
pages = {29--45},
}
Dokument aufrufenHelm und Wirl, "Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation" Journal of Economics 132.1: 41-65. 2021.