The German railway has tested the use of "bodycams" at railway stations. Security staff at hotspots will soon be equipped with the cameras. An interview with Oldenburg data protection experts Jürgen Taeger and Edgar Rose.
QUESTION: Mr Taeger, what exactly are bodycams?
TAEGER: Bodycams are cameras that are attached to clothing. For employees of DB Sicherheit, a subsidiary of DB AG, they are attached to the chest area of the uniform and have a monitor on which the people in the recording area can be seen when the camera is activated.
QUESTION: In future, bodycams are to supplement DB's already extensive video technology in railway stations and trains. What is the reason for this?
TAEGER: You first have to differentiate here: The permanently installed video cameras at railway stations are used on the basis of Section 27 of the Federal Police Act. The video recordings from these cameras are stored and analysed by the Federal Police. This also applies to the video cameras in the trains. DB Sicherheit, on the other hand, is responsible for the recordings made by the bodycams. The Group uses the video technology to protect its employees and railway customers.
Better protection for employees
ROSE: This motivation is understandable, because working for DB Sicherheit is dangerous. A few figures: with 2,200 employees, there were 1,207 cases of physical injury last year, 92 of which resulted in incapacity for work and therefore counted as reportable accidents at work. The trend is rising. This particular risk situation is the reason why German Railways, as an employer, had to come up with something to better protect its employees.
QUESTION: Mr Taeger, you are a member of the Group's Data Protection Advisory Board and were asked to draw up a legal opinion. What was the basis for this?
TAEGER: DB Sicherheit is not a police body, so there is no authorisation from the Police Act. However, video recordings are personal data. Their collection and processing is only permitted if there is admission for this. The legal basis here is provided by Section 6b of the Federal Data Protection Act, according to which video surveillance of publicly accessible areas is permitted under certain conditions: to enforce domiciliary rights or to protect legitimate interests for specifically defined purposes. On the other hand, there are the legitimate interests of those affected - i.e. the people who may come into the focus of the camera. And, as we know, there are many of them at railway stations: from uninvolved passers-by to troublemakers and known criminals. They all have fundamental rights - such as the basic right to informational self-determination or the right to one's own image.
QUESTION: After weighing up the interests involved, you have come to the conclusion that bodycams can definitely be used. Under what conditions?
ROSE: First of all, their use is only justified where there are centres of danger. So not at every small-town railway station, but where experience has shown that threatening situations arise. During the test phase, for example, German Rail only deployed body cameras at the three major railway stations in Berlin, on regional and suburban trains between these stations and at Cologne's main station during the carnival season.
TAEGER: Another requirement is transparency. Employees with bodycams must all wear a waistcoat - not only to be recognised as members of DB Security. It is also to indicate that a camera may be deployed. However, this does not mean that the bodycam may already be switched on under these conditions. We have defined a clear step-by-step plan.
"The reactions are sometimes violent"
QUESTION: What exactly does that look like?
ROSE: Our intention is to de-escalate and resolve the dangerous situation even before the camera is used. We're talking about mobbing and harassment of passers-by, right up to assaults involving bodily harm. In such scenarios, wearing a high-visibility waistcoat is the first step towards de-escalation. The troublemakers are then approached personally, with the announcement that recordings will be made if they do not comply with DB Sicherheit's requests. Next, the employees would activate the camera screen without recording anything.
QUESTION: So the person sees themselves on the screen, like a selfie. What effect does that have?
ROSE: The reactions are sometimes strong - we know that from interviews we conducted with security staff during the test phase. Some of the people involved raised their hands as if a gun was pointed at them, or they simply ran away. This shows how strong the preventative effect of seeing yourself on the bodycam monitor already is. At the same time, it shows the high intensity of the interference with personal rights that can be caused by bodycams. There therefore needs to be a good reason for this, which can be found here in the high risk situation for DB employees and passers-by, and in the deployment concept, which is strictly based on the principle of proportionality. The employees responsible must also be very well trained in order to be able to proceed reliably and proportionately in such situations, step by step.
TAEGER: If this activation of the monitor alone does not lead to de-escalation, the camera will actually be switched on - again after notification.
QUESTION: How do the railway employees involved so far rate the operation?
ROSE: The response has been very positive, especially as the results from the test phase speak for themselves: Extrapolated to the same number of deployment hours, there were 30 bodily injuries during patrols without bodycams; in contrast, there was only one bodily injury during patrols with bodycams.
"The legal situation is different with facial recognition"
QUESTION: Change of subject: Biometric facial recognition is also currently the subject of much discussion. This was tested at Berlin's Südkreuz railway station with volunteers whose photos were stored in the system. How do you rate this development?
TAEGER: The legal situation is completely different with facial recognition. The federal government is taking the first step by testing this technology, which is not yet fully developed. And that is precisely my concern: that further steps will follow and then at some point, nationwide video surveillance with facial recognition will be introduced in Germany. I personally don't want that, and it would not be constitutionally legitimised - neither under the European Charter of Fundamental Rights nor under the German Basic Law. Even the planned test run at Südkreuz is legally inadmissible, especially as the justification that the test subjects have given their consent cannot legitimise the recording of other passers-by who are also scanned by the system.
QUESTION: In this context, what do you think of the fact that the legislator has amended the Identity Card and Passport Act?
TAEGER: You are referring to the new Section 25 (2) of the ID Card Act, which came into force in July. It paved the way for the retrieval of biometric photographs from the electronic registers of the decentralised registration authorities by the centrally organised security authorities, i.e. the secret services and the police. "To fulfil their tasks", as they say. Even the tax investigation and customs authorities are allowed to retrieve the photographs and store them centrally. This is even possible in the case of traffic offences.
"Point out dangers at an early stage"
QUESTION: What do the security services do with this data? When can they use it and for what?
TAEGER: That's a good question. There does need to be a specific reason for this, but not a court order, as in the case of a deprivation of liberty or a house search, for example, which also constitute an encroachment on fundamental rights.
QUESTION: Are these the first steps towards a surveillance state?
TAEGER: In connection with the facial recognition system that is now being tested, the material for nationwide surveillance of individuals would be technically available. This is not currently a reality - but we should observe and evaluate this development with the utmost sensitivity based on historical experience. We are therefore well advised to draw attention to these dangers at an early stage in order to counter a creeping development towards surveillance measures that are incompatible with the Basic Law.