by Sascha Oswald and Danielle Gluns
Hardly any other topic has dominated the public debate in recent years as much as migration and, in this context, in particular the handling of the phenomenon of flight and refugees. The dominance of the discourse has shifted "from a culture of welcome to a mood of emergency" (Duisburg Institute for Linguistic and Social Research). Two positions are particularly visible in the discourse: on the one hand, those who emphasise humanitarian protection for refugees and, on the other hand, those who call for immigration to be limited and postulate the negative effects of (refugee) immigration.
This juxtaposition of seemingly clear political positions and demands is a means of constructing identities: "People who see migration as a problem increasingly see themselves as a community, even if it is imagined," postulates conflict researcher Andreas Zick. This supposed sense of belonging reduces the fear of losing one's cultural identity, which, according to a study by MIDEM, is often the reason for voting for right-wing populist parties. However, the reverse is also true - for example, the range of "Refugees Welcome" merchandise is flourishing: from T-shirts and mugs to cookery books, there are countless consumer items that allow people to morally position themselves by means of a simple slogan and assign themselves to a community of convictions. Basically, the following therefore applies: by staging myself as an opponent or supporter of immigration and receiving encouragement from others, I can see myself as part of a seemingly homogeneous group.
In digital discourse, these two positions are staged in particularly contrasting ways. Depending on what you say, you are quickly identified as a neo-Nazi or a "left-wing greenfilth" do-gooder. The already high use of ad hominem arguments (i.e. devaluing a position by attacking the person speaking) in comment columns or forums takes on a special form here. The attribution is implicit, i.e. the person (and therefore their argumentation) is not devalued through the explicit attribution of characteristics (liar, opportunist, stupid, senile, prejudiced) but through identification with a camp and the associations implied by this. Individual sentences or statements are often decisive for such localisation.
The discourse is thus truncated in two ways. 1) Argumentations are predominantly read partially and fragmentarily, i.e. the course of argumentation as a whole is not evaluated; instead, individual discourse elements serve as hooks for categorisations. 2) These categorisations are generalised. "Empty signifiers" (Laclau) are used, i.e. buzzwords without concrete content that serve as nodes for an "imaginary unity" (Reckwitz). The range of conservative and progressive positions is ignored in favour of a clear formation of camps - and even more: the identities produced in this way in the attribution of self and others are designed as antipodean enemy images. Within the corresponding apocalyptic grand narratives (such as the Islamisation of the West or the imminent re-enactment of the Holocaust), there is no room for differentiation - every participant in the discourse must be able to be identified and assigned without a doubt. Attempts at differentiation often end with the other person picking out the statement before or after the "but" and judging it as representative. You are either for or against, there is no middleground or grey area.
The participants in the discourse thus increasingly give themselves an identity, ascribe themselves to a certain group or camp, and are simultaneously thematised as such by the other side - both processes naturally reinforce each other. The fact that the translocal communication structures of the internet promote the visibility of and exchange with like-minded people also contributes to the formation of filter bubbles, as has often been discussed, but also to the assumption of forming a collective representing the general public - a "we". Although the exchange takes place within the framework of genuine interactive communities, which is why the concept of "imagined communities" (Anderson) is at least open to debate, the suggestion of homogeneity and reach that emanates from digital platforms is nevertheless countered by a much more heterogeneous reality outside the network.
Nevertheless, it is precisely the aforementioned group-identity signs under which public and social issues are increasingly being negotiated that hardly allow for any differentiation in the discourse. The desire for internal coherence necessitates a radical and uncompromising struggle for positions that is primarily aimed at self-assertion - the participants become "propagandists of their attributes", as Milan Kundera once called it.
Politicians often react schizophrenically and helplessly to this development: instead of contributing to a more differentiated debate with clear arguments, politicians use set pieces from both positions in their discourse. For example, Federal Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer described migration as "the mother of all problems". At the same time, he called for "#protection for people who are in need of protection". The SPD does not seem to want to take a clear position either, for example before the "Orderly Return Act" was passed: "Party leader Andrea Nahles? Didn't say a critical word in public, that's for sure. Words like solidarity no longer go down so well at grassroots level" (Constanze von Bullion). Whether this use of fragments from the two discourse positions is intended to mobilise votes from both camps or is a failed attempt to adopt a mediating position cannot be answered here. However, it does lead to political positions appearing arbitrary, to which the camps react with increasingly shrill statements.
In fact, attitudes in society are more diverse and open towards migration than is often expected. Fears of distribution struggles, the loss of cultural identity and socio-economic decline do exist. However, the current polarised debate is fuelling this fear rather than reducing it.
What is needed, therefore, is a differentiated discourse that addresses the actual questions: According to which principles do we want to distribute our social resources? How do we understand solidarity? What values are important to us and how do we want to shape social coexistence? Politicians are called upon to convince people with arguments rather than slogans. To do this, however, they must first adopt a clear stance instead of chasing after supposed social trends.
Danielle Gluns, Dr phil., is head of the Migration Policy Research and Transfer Centre at the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Hildesheim.
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Sascha Oswald, M. A., is a research assistant at the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Hildesheim.
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