Universität Oldenburg
Fakultät II – Department für Informatik
Abteilung Safety-Security-Interaction
26111 Oldenburg


Ingrid Ahlhorn

+49 (0) 441 - 798 2426

A05 1-134

Uhlhornsweg 84,  26129 Oldenburg


Herzlich willkommen auf den Webseiten der Abteilung für Safety-Security-Interaction!

Die Abteilung für Safety-Security-Interaction beschäftigt sich mit der Entwicklung theoretisch fundierter Verfahren zur Wahrung der Sicherheit (security) von IT-Systemen im Kontext sicherheitskritischer Systeme und des Internets der Dinge. Schwerpunkt ist die Entwicklung von Sicherheitslösungen, welche auf die Kontext-spezifischen Rahmenbedingungen zugeschnitten sind und verschiedenartige Benutzerinteraktionen (interaction) sowie die funktionale Sicherheit (safety) der zu schützenden Systeme berücksichtigen.

Wir suchen nach motivierten UniversitätsabsolventInnen, die unsere Abteilung unterstützen möchten und an einer Promotion bei uns interessiert sind (» Stellenausschreibungen). Wenn Sie Interesse haben, dann melden Sie sich bitte bei uns!


Erfolgreiche Verteidigung der Doktorarbeit von Herson Esquivel Vargas

Herson Esquivel Vargas hat seine Doktorarbeit mit dem Titel „Towards Automated Identification and Assessment of Security Weaknesses in Smart Buildings” am 25. November 2022 erfolgreich verteidigt. Herzlichen Glückwunsch!

Am 25. November 2022 hat Herson Esquivel Vargas seine Doktorarbeit mit dem Titel „Towards Automated Identification and Assessment of Security Weaknesses in Smart Buildings” erfolgreich verteidigt.

Erstbetreuer der Arbeit war Prof. Dr. Andreas Peter (Universität Oldenburg) und Zweitbetreuer war Prof. Dr. Pieter Hartel (Universität Twente, Niederlande). Dr. Marco Caselli (Siemens AG) hat als externer Betreuer unterstützt.

Ferner waren folgende Kommissionsmitglieder in der Bewertung der Arbeit involviert:

  • Prof. Dr. Joost Kok, Universität Twente, Niederlande (Kommissionsvorsitzender)
  • Prof. Dr. Aiko Pras, Universität Twente, Niederlande
  • Prof. Dr. Maarten van Steen, Universität Twente, Niederlande
  • Dr. Cristina Alcaraz, Universität Malaga, Spanien
  • Dr. Nile Ole Tippenhauer, CISPA, Deutschland
  • Prof. Dr. Sandro Etalle, Technische Universität Eindhoven, Niederlande

Es folgt eine kurze Zusammenfassung der Doktorarbeit (auf Englisch):

Smart buildings are equipped with computer systems that monitor and control diverse services such as air conditioning, indoor transportation, physical access control, and many others. Critical infrastructures like hospitals, airports, and data centers, leverage on such services to support their daily operations. However, the current popularity of smart buildings is founded on a decades-long history. Smart building systems have evolved from isolated networks using proprietary protocols to IT-integrated systems that use standardized communication protocols. They might even be connected to the Internet to allow remote building management. This transition has exposed smart buildings to a whole new set of security threats. For instance, there have been documented cases where attackers have managed to remotely disrupt the environmental conditions and physical access control of smart buildings. Due to the crucial role that smart buildings play in supporting organizations and the serious threat of cyber attacks against them, there is a pressing need to investigate how to improve their current security posture.

The transfer of mature IT security solutions to smart building systems seems a natural approach to enhance their security, however, the fundamental differences between both domains often require significant adaptation effort or to develop completely new solutions. For this reason, in recent years, a growing body knowledge about smart buildings security has been developed. However, most of these solutions have focused on intrusion detection and little efforts have been made to prevent cyber attacks. An effective way to prevent cyber attacks against smart buildings is by preemptively handling security weaknesses in customized applications and configurations that run the system. Unfortunately, this is often overlooked by smart building administrators due to, e.g., lack of specialized tools, staff, and training. We identify not only a research gap regarding this important task, but also an urgent need to provide (semi-) automated tools that help overcome the limitations faced by smart building administrators. The implementation of these tools requires sophisticated methods that incorporate technical and business-related insights to handle weaknesses according to the organization’s best interest.

In this thesis, we investigate how to implement the first stages of a vulnerability management process for smart building applications and configurations. Beyond just vulnerabilities, we consider the weaknesses that give rise to vulnerabilities. In particular, our contributions address the identification and assessment of security weaknesses for later remediation. These are two key activities to preemptively strengthen the security of smart buildings. The identification of weaknesses is the basis of any vulnerability management process as it provides the first insights about the current security state of a system. This is a challenging task because a deep understanding of the system’s inner workings is often needed to obtain meaningful findings. We propose two approaches to identify security weaknesses; one focused on smart building applications and another on smart building configurations. In the first case, we model the application as a graph data structure comprised of sensors, setpoints, actuators, and control function nodes. The relationships among these components reveal the architecture of the system, which can then be analyzed in the search for security weaknesses. In the second case, we look for component misconfigurations that can be observed in their behavior, i.e., the way they interact with other components in the system. Leveraging official documentation from the components’ manufacturers, we create a model of valid behavior for each of them, which is then compared with their actual behavior as observed in the network traffic. After identifying security weaknesses, we assess the sensitivity of the affected components, which is an important factor to prioritize weaknesses for later remediation. We propose a comprehensive approach to assess the sensitivity of smart building components based on technical and business-related features. The proposed methods are evaluated in real smart buildings and additional experiments are performed in testbeds and comparable simulated environments. These evaluations confirm the feasibility and effectivity of our (semi-) automated weakness identification and assessment approaches.

Link zur Doktorarbeit:

(Stand: 16.03.2023)  |