Nele Röttger

History and Philosophy of Medicine, Department of Philosophy, Bielefeld University

Even if one knew what was good for another person, there are compelling ethical reasons against imposing on that person through intrusive actions or well-meaning advice. Why, then, should one even address the question posed in the title of this lecture? I argue that the question of whether one can know what is good for another person must be answered in the negative, not only for ethical but also for epistemic reasons. Following a definition of ‘experiential knowledge’, I shall demonstrate in this lecture that, with regard to certain life issues – such as dealing with mental and physical health and illness – a specific form of knowledge is required. This knowledge is characterised, amongst other things, by the fact that it is acquired through a process which a person experiences over time and in dealing with themselves. It follows from this hypothesis that (1) experiential knowledge can only be acquired by the person themselves, as it is they who have these experiences. The hypothesis suggests (2) that experiential knowledge is itself a process and requires reflection on the respective experiences. Against this background, it becomes clear that the assumption that one can know what is good for another person is, for epistemic reasons, incorrect in a certain respect. Admittedly, from a medical or nursing perspective, for example, one can recognise certain therapies or measures as being indicated. However, one cannot know how this relates to the person’s wider experiences in dealing with health and illness. This is particularly relevant in the case of mental health conditions, chronic illnesses or disabilities. At the same time, the processual nature inherent in the concept of experiential knowledge suggests that people need trust in themselves and others in order to consciously develop experiential knowledge. This trust can be both strengthened and weakened by structures and individuals within the healthcare system. In my lecture, I argue that there is also an ethical obligation, for epistemic reasons, to accompany people through such processes and to support them in understanding and reflecting on their experiences, in order to strengthen their self-confidence and thereby support them in managing their health and illness in a self-determined and self-effective manner.